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ABSTRACT 
 The recent spate of cases in which reporters have been 
subpoenaed, fined, jailed, or otherwise disciplined has laid bare the 
divisions among the courts over the existence and scope of the 
“reporter’s privilege.”  The cases have also exposed the doctrinal, 
historical, and theoretical infirmities of the broader law of 
newsgathering, which encompasses not only source relationships, 
but also rights of access to places and records, protections against 
civil and criminal liability for torts and crimes committed in the 
pursuit of news, and protections against government searches of 
newsrooms and phone records, among other things.  Resolving these 
conflicts has grown more urgent with the democratization of media 
and the emergence of bloggers and other news providers who have 
challenged traditional conceptions of “journalists” and “the press.” 
 To settle these controversies, this Article seeks to move past the 
courts’ desultory analyses, focus on core principles, and situate those 
assessments in the context of a particular approach to constitutional 
interpretation.  This Article proposes a “sequential” interpretation of 
the First Amendment—an approach that assesses, in turn, the text of 
the Amendment, its history, its place in the broader constitutional 
structure, and its contemporary meaning in light of substantial social 
change.  This approach draws upon conventional interpretive 
frameworks to show that there is abundant constitutional support to 
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recognize most aspects of the right to gather news, including the 
reporter’s privilege, and that doing so does not require any 
interpretive contortions.  However, recognizing some newsgathering 
rights depends on a more egalitarian definition of “journalist”—one 
that emphasizes the function served by newsgatherers, and not their 
social or professional status or credentials.  And although there is a 
historical and constitutional foundation for many newsgathering 
protections, some access claims and liability defenses—particularly 
those that are dependent on an affirmative-rights construction of the 
First Amendment—are not constitutionally cognizable, despite their 
appeal as matters of policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
he summer of 2007 should have been a propitious time for 
Major League Baseball.  With Sammy Sosa becoming only the 
fifth player in league history to hit six hundred home runs,1 and Barry 
Bonds eclipsing the most storied record in sports—Hank Aaron’s 755 
career home runs—one might have expected the same kind of 
ceremonial pomp that accompanied Mark McGwire’s sixty-second 
home run in 19982 or Cal Ripken’s 2131st consecutive game in 1995.3  
But with baseball still reeling from reports that some of its biggest 
stars, including Sosa and Bonds, were steroid users, the 2007 
celebrations were awkward and perfunctory. 
Rumors of steroid use in baseball have percolated for years, but 
the issue erupted after a March 2005 congressional hearing and the 
publication of a series of news stories filled with damaging 
disclosures,4 admissions,5 and accusations.6  The most explosive report 
came from San Francisco Chronicle reporters Mark Fainaru-Wada 
 
 1. Babe Ruth, Willie Mayes, Hank Aaron, and Barry Bonds are the others.  Career 
Leaders & Records for Home Runs, at http://www.baseball-reference.com/leaders/ 
HR_career.shtml. 
 2. On September 8, 1998, McGwire broke Roger Maris’s record of sixty-one home runs in 
a season.  McGwire finished the season with seventy home runs.  Barry Bonds broke McGwire’s 
record when he hit seventy-three home runs in 2001. 
 3. On September 6, 1995, Ripken broke Lou Gehrig’s record of 2130 consecutive games 
played.  Ripken’s streak ended after 2,632 games in 1998. 
 4. During the March 17, 2005, hearing before the House Government Reform 
Committee, McGwire effectively admitted his past steroid use by refusing to directly answer 
questions on the subject.  Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League 
Baseball’s Efforts To Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 
109th Cong. (2005).  And less than five months after shaking his finger at the congressional 
panel and declaring, “I have never used steroids.  Period,” id. at 227, then-Baltimore Orioles 
player Raphael Palmeiro was reported to have failed a steroid test.  See Associated Press, 
Palmeiro Still Not Sure Why He Tested Positive, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 2005, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2005-12-28-palmeiro-steroid_x.htm. 
 5. The most prominent admission came from New York Yankee Jason Giambi who 
conceded in December 2004 that he had used steroids.  His brother Jeremy, a minor league 
player, admitted the same in March 2005, just days before the congressional hearing.  Todd 
Zolecki, Ex-Phil Jeremy Giambi Admits To Using Steroids, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 14, 2005, at 
C3.  Previously, ex-players Ken Caminiti and Jose Canseco had made similar admissions.  See 
Larry Stone, Believe Canseco?  We Might Have To, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at C1. 
 6. In April 2005, former Philadelphia Phillies player Lenny Dykstra was accused by his 
friend and business partner of having used steroids.  Associated Press, Between the Seams: 
Dykstra Accused of Using Steroids, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, available at 
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=seam25& 
date=20050425&query=dykstra+accused.  Jose Canseco published a book replete with claims 
that various major league players, including Mark McGuire and Sammy Sosa, were steroid 
users.  JOSE CANSECO, JUICED (2005). 
T 
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and Lance Williams, who revealed that the Bay Area Laboratory 
Cooperative (BALCO) did not merely manufacture nutritional 
supplements, but also distributed exotic steroids.  Williams and 
Fairanu-Wada also provided compelling evidence that Bonds, 
arguably the greatest player of his generation, was one of BALCO’s 
steroid clients.7 
Fainaru-Wada and Williams, who published their reports both in 
the Chronicle and later in the book Game of Shadows, exposed 
widespread criminal wrongdoing8 and were lionized for their work.  
They were also subpoenaed.9  United States Attorney Debra Wong 
Yang demanded that the reporters reveal the source of some of their 
key information—specifically, leaked testimony from witnesses in the 
grand jury investigation of BALCO.10  When Fairanu-Wada and 
Williams refused, the court held them in civil contempt and ordered 
them to serve eighteen months in prison.  Before their appeal could 
be heard, defense attorney Troy Ellerman admitted to being the 
source of the secret testimony, so the subpoenas were withdrawn.11 
Had Ellerman not come forward, Fairanu-Wada and Williams 
would likely have gone to prison.  The federal courts have taken a 
jaundiced view of reporter–source confidentiality over the past 
several years,12 and rulings in some high-profile cases have 
 
 7. The reporters say Bonds was jealous about the success of McGuire, who broke Roger 
Maris’s single-season home-run record in 1999 while using androstenedione, which is now a 
banned substance.  Bonds decided then to start taking “the shit” in order to elevate his game 
and reclaim the spotlight.  MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS 
xvi (2006). 
 8. It became illegal to use steroids without a prescription after passage of the Anabolic 
Steroid Control Act of 1990.  Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1902, 
104 Stat. 4851 (1990).  Distributors of steroids can be punished by up to five years in prison and 
a $250,000 fine.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2006). 
 9. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, No. CR 06-
90225 JSW, 2006 WL 2734275 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006). 
 10. Federal officials began investigating BALCO in 2003, and it has been the focus of a 
grand jury proceeding ever since.  So far, BALCO President Victor Conte and several 
associates, including Bonds’s personal trainer, have been convicted, and others have been 
indicted.  Among the many athletes who have been linked to BALCO are Olympic sprinters 
Tim Montgomery and Marion Jones, Olympic shot-putter C.J. Hunter, and Major League 
Baseball players Giambi and Bonds.  See FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 7. 
 11. On July 12, 2007, Ellerman was sentenced to two and a half years in prison for his role 
in the leak.  See Bob Egelko, The BALCO Case: Judge Sends Leaker to Slammer, Chides Bush, 
S.F. CHRON., July 13, 2007, at B4. 
 12. See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) (refusing to recognize a 
reporter’s privilege). See also Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers and Fourth Estate Inmates: 
The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385 (2006); 
Kara A. Larson, The Demise of the First Amendment Reporter’s Privilege: Why this Current 
04__UGLAND_FINAL.DOC 7/23/2008  9:34:02 AM 
2008] DEMARCATING THE RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS 117 
underscored reporters’ vulnerability to federal subpoenas.  In 2006, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld a contempt citation against freelance 
videographer and blogger Joshua Wolf, who had been subpoenaed to 
testify and to turn over video footage he gathered of a San Francisco 
protest in which a police car was burned.13  Wolf was imprisoned for 
226 days—the longest sentence ever served by a journalist for 
refusing to comply with a subpoena—before he was released in April 
2007.14 
Two years earlier, the D.C. Circuit rejected New York Times 
reporter Judith Miller’s attempts to quash a subpoena that sought the 
name of the source who leaked to her the identity of undercover CIA 
agent Valerie (Plame) Wilson.15  In that case, which grew out of 
Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald’s ongoing investigation into 
illegal leaks at the White House,16 Miller was held in contempt and 
spent eighty-five days in prison before securing a waiver from her 
 
Trend Should Not Surprise the Media, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1235 (2005); Anthony L. Fargo, Is 
Protection from Subpoenas Slipping? An Analysis of Three Recent Cases Involving Broadcast 
News Outtakes, 47(3) J. OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 455 (2003). 
 13. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 Fed. App’x 430 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 14. Video Blogger is Now Longest-Jailed American Journalist, REPORTERS COMMITTEE 
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2007/0206-
con-videob.html. 
 15. Miller’s motion to quash was denied by U.S. District Court Judge Thomas F. Hogan in 
In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004).  Her appeal of the 
contempt citation was rejected by the D.C. Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 
397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh’g denied, 405 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 
2977 (2005).  Citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655 (1972), the D.C. Circuit held that 
journalists do not have a First Amendment right to refuse to comply with grand jury subpoenas.  
In re Miller, 397 F.3d at 968.  The Court neither accepted nor rejected Miller’s second argument 
that she was entitled to journalist’s privilege protection under the federal common law.  The 
court was divided on the question of the existence of a common law privilege, but concluded 
that even if one does exist, the government had provided sufficient evidence to overcome it.  Id. 
at 972–73. 
 16. This investigation is focused on whether government officials illegally leaked the 
identity of undercover CIA agent Valerie Wilson, also known by her maiden name, Valerie 
Plame, to reporters in the summer of 2003.  The investigation was triggered by a column 
published July 14, 2003, by Robert Novak, which disclosed that Plame, the wife of former 
diplomat Joseph C. Wilson IV, was a CIA agent.  Novak attributed this information to “two 
administration sources.”  As part of a grand jury inquiry into possible illegal leaks, Fitzgerald 
subpoenaed several reporters to determine whether they had been told Plame’s identity by 
government officials and to determine the names of those officials.  Novak was the only 
journalist to publish Plame’s name and the fact that she was an undercover agent.  Some have 
suggested that government officials deliberately leaked this information to reporters as an act of 
retribution against Wilson who had written a July 2003 opinion piece in the New York Times 
that debunked administration claims about Iraq’s possession and pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
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source.17  Shortly thereafter, Miller and a former colleague at the New 
York Times, Philip Shenon, became the targets of another attempt by 
the government to discover the identities of their confidential 
sources—this time over stories the reporters wrote about a planned 
government raid of two Islamic charities suspected of funding 
terrorists.  Fitzgerald, also the prosecutor in the Islamic charities case, 
wanted to know who informed the reporters so he seized their phone 
records.  Miller and Shenon challenged the seizure, but the Second 
Circuit rejected their claims,18 and in November 2006, the Supreme 
Court refused to halt the government’s review of the records.19 
Miller, Shenon, Wolf, Fairanu-Wada, and Williams are the most 
recent combatants20 in an ongoing, thirty-five-year struggle for judicial 
recognition of a “reporter’s privilege”—the right of journalists to 
refuse to comply with certain subpoenas seeking their testimony or 
work products.21  Although these reporters’ legal battles have 
rekindled interest in the privilege and spurred congressional 
consideration of a federal shield law,22 the high profile of these 
 
 17. U.S. District Court Judge Thomas F. Hogan held Miller in contempt in October 2004.  
On September 30, 2005, after receiving a waiver of confidentiality from her source, I. Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby, Chief of Staff to Vice President Richard Cheney, Miller testified that although 
she had had a confidential interview with Libby, and although the name “Valerie Flame” [sic] 
appears in her notes from that interview, she did not believe that Libby mentioned Plame’s 
name to her, and that the reference in her notes to “Valerie Flame” was from an interview with 
a different source whose identity she could not recall.  See Don Van Natta Jr. et al., The Miller 
Case: A Notebook, a Cause, a Jail Cell and a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/national/16leak.htm.  In March 2007, Libby was convicted of 
perjury and obstruction of justice for lying to the grand jury and FBI officials about his role in 
the case.  On July 2, 2007, President George Bush commuted his sentence.  See Amy Goldstein, 
Bush Commutes Libby’s Prison Sentence, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, at A1. 
 18. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 19. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006) (Mem.). 
 20. Wolf and Miller are two of at least twenty-two reporters jailed since 1972 for refusing 
to comply with a subpoena seeking information related to newsgathering activity.  See 
Journalists Jailed, 25 THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW 28 (Fall 2001). 
 21. Work products can include notes, film negatives, videotape, outtakes, computer files, 
audio recordings, and other materials. 
 22. Two bills are currently pending in Congress that would establish a shield law giving 
journalists some protection against subpoenas in federal cases.  The bills, H.R. 2102, sponsored 
by Reps. Mike Pence (R-Ind.) and Rich Boucher (D-Va.), and S. 1267, sponsored by Sens. 
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), were both introduced in their respective 
chambers on May 2, 2007.  The bills are identical and would provide broad protection for 
journalists to conceal the identities of their confidential sources and substantial protection for 
non-confidential work product as well.  The bills also define “journalist” as anyone engaged in 
the “gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or 
publishing of news or information that concerns local, national or international events or other 
matters of public interest for dissemination to the public.”  H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(5).  
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reporters has perhaps obscured the fact that they are just a few 
among dozens who have been subpoenaed,23 fined,24 imprisoned,25 or 
otherwise disciplined by judges and prosecutors in the past few years.  
These reporter–court entanglements, many of which remain 
unresolved, have laid bare the divisions among courts on the issue of 
privilege.  And they have exposed the doctrinal, historical, and 
theoretical infirmities of the broader legal framework that governs 
newsgathering, which not only protects source relationships, but also 
protects against civil and criminal liability for torts and crimes 
committed by journalists in the pursuit of news, protects against 
newsroom searches, and protects access to places and records, among 
other things.  These problems have persisted for decades, and 
resolving them has grown all the more urgent with the 
 
Presumably, then, this protection would extend to bloggers and other non-traditional 
journalists. 
 23. In the White House leak case, several other reporters were subpoenaed, including 
Time’s Matthew Cooper, NBC’s Tim Russert and Andrea Mitchell, and the Washington Post’s 
Bob Woodward, Walter Pincus, and Glenn Kessler.  In December 2004, thirteen news 
organizations were subpoenaed to provide information,including the identities of confidential 
sources, in a civil Privacy Act suit brought by former FBI official James Hatfill who claimed he 
was wrongly identified as a suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States.  In July 
2007, Hatfill sought the reporters’ confidential source information, and on August 14, 2007, U.S. 
District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton ordered five reporters—Mickael Isikoff and Daniel 
Klaidman of Newsweek, Allen Lengel of the Washington Post, Toni Locy of USA Today, and 
James Swart of CBS News—to testify in the case.  For more on these and other news media 
subpoena cases, see Reporters and Federal Subpoenas, http://www.rcfp.org/ 
shields_and_subpoenas.html. 
 24. In November 2005, for example, U.S. District Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held 
Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus in contempt and ordered him to pay $500 per day for 
refusing to disclose the names of his confidential sources in a civil case brought by former Los 
Alamos Nuclear Laboratory physicist Wen Ho Lee against the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Energy.  Lee accused those agencies of violating the Privacy Act by releasing 
private information about him without his consent.  In August 2004, in this same proceeding, 
five other reporters were held in contempt for refusing to reveal their sources.  All but one of 
the contempt citations were upheld on appeal by the D.C. Circuit.  Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  This case was settled in June 2006, with contributions to the 
settlement by the subpoenaed media parties. 
 25. In addition to Joshua Wolf and Judith Miller, Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper 
was also held in contempt in the White House leak investigation and was on the verge of going 
to jail before securing a last-minute waiver of confidentiality from his source.  Television 
reporter Jim Taricani was sentenced to jail for contempt after refusing to identify his 
confidential source to prosecutors investigating government corruption in Providence, R.I.  
(Because Taricani has a heart condition, his sentence was later changed from jail time to home 
confinement).  And in 2001–2002, freelance author Vanessa Leggett was held in contempt for 
refusing to turn over tapes of interviews she had conducted with witnesses whom prosecutors 
believed had information relevant to a murder investigation.  She served 168 days in jail—then 
the longest sentence ever served by a reporter in a privilege case.  Press Release, Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Vanessa Leggett Released From Jail After 168 Days (Jan. 
4, 2002), available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/releases/view.cgi?2002_01_04_vlreleas.txt. 
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democratization of media and the emergence of a new cohort of 
bloggers and other independent news providers who have challenged 
traditional definitions of “journalists” and “the press.” 
Although today’s media environment and broader social 
conditions have changed since the early 1970s when debate over 
newsgathering rights began in earnest, the fundamental questions 
have not: is there a First Amendment right to gather news, who is 
entitled to claim its protections, and over what behavior does it 
extend?  It is axiomatic that all citizens enjoy a right to express 
themselves.  The right to seek out information, however, is indistinct.  
Over the past three decades, journalists have sought to broaden the 
definition of press freedom to protect newsgathering, arguing that if 
they are to serve the highest purposes of their profession, freedom of 
the press must encompass more than the right to publish what they 
know; it must also protect their pursuit of the unknown.  Journalists 
have therefore fought, with varied success, for judicial 
acknowledgement of a right to attend judicial proceedings,26 to access 
government records,27 to monitor activities in federal prisons,28 to 
break promises with their confidential sources without being sued for 
damages,29 to be protected against tort claims targeting their 
newsgathering activity,30 and to be exempt from prosecution for 
certain crimes committed in their pursuit of news.31  They have also 
challenged restrictions that intrude too deeply on journalistic 
autonomy and which they say have the potential to inhibit both 
journalistic expression and investigative zeal.  These include 
government subpoenas of their confidential materials,32 government 
 
 26. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that the public, 
including the press, has a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials). 
 27. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) 
(holding that the government did not violate the Freedom of Information Act by refusing to 
disclose the contents of FBI rap sheets). 
 28. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (holding that a federal regulation 
prohibiting press interviews with prison inmates did not violate the First Amendment). 
 29. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that journalists have no First 
Amendment protection against the application of generally applicable laws). 
 30. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
journalists enjoy no special immunity from tort claims arising from their newsgathering 
behavior). 
 31. United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 
(2000) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect journalists when they engage in 
illegal conduct). 
 32. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that a journalist does not have a First 
Amendment right to refuse to comply with a grand jury subpoena seeking testimony about 
crimes he or she witnessed). 
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searches of their newsrooms,33 and attempts to compel disclosure of 
the details of their editorial decision-making processes.34  Journalists 
argue that protecting against all of these encumbrances on 
newsgathering is essential, not merely as a matter of public policy, but 
as a matter of constitutional law. 
Some courts have been sympathetic to these challenges, but many 
have rejected them, showing little patience for what judges often 
construe as media demands for “special rights.”35  The mixed success 
of media litigants and the lack of conclusive rulings from the U.S. 
Supreme Court have yielded a body of law that is conflicted in both 
its outcomes and its rationales.  The newsgathering rights of the press 
vary across jurisdictions and few doctrinal or theoretical threads hold 
the courts’ decisions together.  Case law regarding the right to gather 
news is almost entirely built around either ad hoc arguments or 
mechanical applications of precedent.  Rarely do judges connect their 
rulings to broader theories of free expression, and even more rarely 
do judges attempt to tie these determinations to a particular approach 
to constitutional interpretation.  To settle contemporary controversies 
over the right to gather news, this Article moves past the courts’ 
desultory analyses, focuses on the core principles that underlie the 
broader law of newsgathering, and situates those assessments in the 
context of a specific approach to constitutional interpretation. 
This Article pays special attention to three long-debated but 
inadequately answered questions: (1) Should the Press Clause36 of the 
First Amendment be interpreted as having a separate meaning apart 
from the Speech Clause?37  More specifically, should the Press Clause 
 
 33. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (holding that journalists do not have a 
First Amendment right to refuse to comply with an otherwise valid search warrant). 
 34. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (holding that journalists do not have a First 
Amendment right to refuse to testify about their state of mind at the time they published 
allegedly defamatory material). 
 35. See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We do not see why 
there need to be special criteria merely because the possessor of the documents or other 
evidence sought is a journalist.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp. 293, 
296–97 (D.N.J. 1993) (“It is naïve to blindly acknowledge or adopt the unfettered First 
Amendment freedoms espoused by the press . . . .”).  Many courts also cite the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 738, which rejects the idea of “special safeguards” for the 
press and also its opinion in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937), saying that 
a newspaper “has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . 
the press . . . .”). 
 37. Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). 
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be read as bestowing a set of special rights on the press not possessed 
by the public generally?  (2) To the extent that any unique protections 
are provided to the press, how should “the press” and “journalist” be 
defined?  (3) Does the First Amendment provide the press, the public, 
or both a set of affirmative rights—rights of access to information or 
places, for example—that protect non-expressive actions aimed at 
uncovering rather than disseminating information? 
These are questions most courts have avoided even though they 
have been the subjects of scholarly examination.38  And they are at the 
center of the longstanding constitutional quarrels over particular 
newsgathering practices, the most important of which involve 
autonomy (including not only the reporter’s privilege but also 
protections against government inquiries into journalists’ editorial 
decision-making and protections against newsroom searches), access 
(including access to records, courts and government property), and 
liability (including protection from both civil tort claims and criminal 
charges stemming from journalists’ newsgathering activity). 
This Article addresses these issues by proposing a “sequential” 
interpretation of the First Amendment—an approach that assesses, in 
turn, the text of the Amendment, its history, its place in the broader 
constitutional structure, and its contemporary meaning in light of 
substantial social change.  This approach draws upon conventional 
interpretive theories, each of which represents an essential line of 
inquiry, but none of which is sufficient by itself.  This Article shows 
that constitutional support for recognizing most aspects of the right to 
gather news, including the reporter’s privilege, is abundant and that 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of these issues is fundamentally 
flawed.  Furthermore, even those who apply more conservative 
interpretive approaches should find substantial evidence pointing to a 
more expansive view than the one the Supreme Court and many 
 
 38. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429 (2002); 
Matthew Bunker et al., Triggering the First Amendment: Newsgathering Torts and Press 
Freedom, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273 (1999); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access and 
the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1992); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press 
Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism? 7 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 595 (1979); Floyd Abrams, The Press is Different: Reflections on Justice 
Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 565 (1979); William W. Van Alstyne, 
The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a ‘Preferred Position,’ 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977); Potter 
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is 
Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech? 26 HASTINGS L.J. 
639 (1975); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1641 (1967). 
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lower courts have endorsed.  However, recognizing some of these 
newsgathering protections depends on a more egalitarian definition 
of “journalist”—one that emphasizes the function served by 
newsgatherers, and not their social or professional status or 
credentials.39  And although there is a historical and constitutional 
foundation for many newsgathering protections, some access claims 
and liability defenses—particularly those that are dependent on an 
affirmative-rights40 construction of the First Amendment—are not 
constitutionally cognizable, despite their appeal as matters of public 
policy. 
Part I of this Article identifies the central questions that must be 
answered to forge a consistent and sustainable First Amendment 
jurisprudence and outlines the ways in which the current law of 
newsgathering remains conflicted.  Part II proposes a sequential 
approach to constitutional interpretation and explains how that 
theory fits within, and draws upon, the menu of traditional 
approaches.  Part III applies the sequential approach to the First 
Amendment.  Part IV provides an analysis of that application and 
what it suggests about the constitutionality of particular 
newsgathering restrictions.  Part V concludes the Article by providing 
a set of recommendations for reshaping the law of newsgathering. 
I.  THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS 
To the extent that the law of newsgathering lacks clarity, much 
blame lies with the Supreme Court, which has supplied a series of 
indefinite rulings, beginning with its 1972 decision in Branzburg v. 
Hayes.41  In Branzburg, the Court held that a reporter who witnesses 
illegal activity does not have a First Amendment right to refuse to 
comply with a grand jury subpoena, even if complying would expose 
 
 39. See Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who is a Journalist, What is the Press and Why 
Does it Matter? Disentangling the Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS 1 
(2007) (distinguishing this egalitarian model from an “expert model, in which journalists are 
conceived of as a uniquely qualified and clearly identifiable collection of professionals who 
serve as agents of the public in the procurement and dissemination of news”). 
 40. Affirmative or positive rights are those that give the press, the public, or both a right of 
access to information or property within the government’s legitimate control.  They provide 
freedom for the press, as opposed to most negative rights that provide freedom from the 
government.  In this sense, an affirmative right is a sword used to secure some action from the 
government and a negative right is a shield used to repel government encroachments.  See infra 
Part I.C. 
 41. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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the identity of a confidential source.42  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Byron White rejected the idea that reporters should be afforded 
special protections not possessed by the public generally.43  
Nevertheless, his opinion contained an important concession: “News 
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections.”44 In fact, 
White wrote that “without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”45  White did not define 
this right, but acknowledging some level of protection for 
newsgathering seemed to foreclose any suggestion that the rights of 
the press extend only to what journalists publish. 
Although White’s opinion was clear about the disposition of the 
cases before the Court, it did not address many of the underlying 
doctrinal and theoretical questions.  Its precedential weight was also 
limited by the fact the full opinion had the support of only four 
justices.  Justice Lewis Powell issued the decisive vote and held against 
the journalists in Branzburg, but recommended a case-by-case 
assessment of the necessity of subpoenas.46  This effectively made 
Branzburg a 4.5-to-4.5 decision, which gave lower courts latitude to 
supply their own interpretations.47  Some federal circuit courts have 
interpreted Branzburg as rejecting a First Amendment reporter’s 
privilege,48 others have recognized a qualified privilege under either 
the First Amendment or federal common law,49 and some have even 
 
 42. The defendant, Paul Branzburg, was a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal who, 
after promising confidentiality to a source, witnessed the source turning marijuana into hashish.  
The Court consolidated Branzburg’s case with two companion cases, In re Pappas and United 
States v. Caldwell, both of which involved journalists who had been given access to the Black 
Panthers organization on condition that they not publicly identify its members.  Like Branzburg, 
journalists Earl Caldwell and Paul Pappas refused to testify after being subpoenaed by grand 
juries.  Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.  The Court refused to shield any of these reporters from having 
to respond to the grand jury subpoenas. 
 43. Id. at 683. 
 44. Id. at 707. 
 45. Id. at 681. 
 46. Id. at 710 (arguing that each case “should be judged on its facts by the striking of a 
proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant 
testimony with respect to criminal conduct”) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 47. Note, however, that the rule that the press enjoys at least some protection to gather 
news was not limited by Powell’s concurrence.  Indeed, all nine justices agreed that some 
government restrictions of newsgathering would be unconstitutional, although it did not provide 
examples. 
 48. E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987) (affirming Branzburg 
and criticizing other federal circuit courts that recognized a reporter’s privilege outside the 
grand jury context); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 49. E.g., In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 
(5th Cir. 1998); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 
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concluded that Branzburg itself recognized a privilege.50  In addition, 
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have enacted shield 
laws establishing varying degrees of protection,51 Congress is 
considering a federal shield law,52 and many state courts have 
interpreted their state constitutions53 or state common law54 as 
providing some protection for reporters. 
As such, the law of reporter’s privilege is riddled with 
discontinuities.  Each jurisdiction provides a different level of 
protection, each relies upon different rationales, and each employs 
different definitions so that the ability of reporters to quash 
subpoenas depends entirely on where they work.  The law governing 
other newsgathering practices is similarly uneven, so there is certainly 
a need for the Supreme Court to reenter the field and provide some 
doctrinal and theoretical ballast.  The Court will almost certainly get 
that chance in the next year or two as reporters like Fainaru-Wada, 
 
841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 50. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 51. See Federal Shield Laws Introduced in Both Houses, Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press (May 2, 2007), available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2007/0502-con-
federa.html.  The shield-law states are the following: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington.  Most shield laws provide qualified 
protection, using a version of the three-part balancing test proposed by Justice Stewart in his 
dissenting opinion in Branzburg.  408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Under that test, 
parties can only compel a response to a subpoena when they can: 
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that 
is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the 
information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First 
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the 
information. 
Id.  The Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act provides a representative example of the ways 
in which states have codified Stewart’s dissent.  It compels the disclosure of covered materials 
only if the party seeking disclosure proves: 
(1) that there is probable cause to believe that the specific information sought (i) is 
clearly relevant to a gross misdemeanor or felony, or (ii) is clearly relevant to a 
misdemeanor so long as the information would not tend to identify the source of the 
information or the means through which it was obtained, (2) that the information 
cannot be obtained by any alternative means or remedy less destructive of first 
amendment rights, and (3) that there is a compelling and overriding interest requiring 
the disclosure of the information where the disclosure is necessary to prevent injustice. 
Minn Stat. § 595.024, subd. 2 (1998). 
 52. See supra note 22. 
 53. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); O’Neill v. Oakgrove 
Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1988); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1987). 
 54. See, e.g., Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982). 
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Williams, and the dozens of others currently under subpoena appeal 
their contempt citations.  If and when the Court does intervene, it will 
have to more squarely address the three core questions that have 
been at the heart of this debate since the beginning: (1) Does the 
Press Clause have a meaning separate from the Speech Clause that 
endows journalists with a unique set of constitutional protections?  
(2) Does the First Amendment protect both affirmative (positive) 
rights and negative rights?55  (3) Who is a journalist? 
A. “Special Rights”: Speech v. Press 
While Branzburg may not have emboldened American journalists 
and their advocates, it did not discourage them either.  In the 
subsequent decade, news organizations brought suits seeking access to 
judicial proceedings,56 prisons,57 and government records.58  They 
sought to establish the autonomy of news organizations and their 
editorial processes by challenging the execution of search warrants on 
newsrooms59 and protesting laws forcing news organizations to 
publish material they do not want to publish.60  And in the face of 
Branzburg, news organizations continued to urge recognition of a 
reporter’s privilege.61 
 
 55. Affirmative rights are distinct from negative rights in that they protect actions and 
behavior that are non-expressive.  Rights of access to records or places, for example, are 
affirmative rights, whereas negative rights protect people from government intrusions on their 
liberty or autonomy.  As applied to journalists, negative rights guard the news media from 
government restrictions of their expression—what they actually publish or broadcast.  Negative 
rights also prevent government actions that interfere with the media’s editorial independence.  
To put it simply, negative rights are more shield than sword because they prevent the 
government from restricting journalists’ expressive functions; affirmative rights are more sword 
than shield because they give journalists the power to make demands on government (access to 
the courts, for example). 
 56. E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (seeking recognition 
a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials). 
 57. E.g., Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 844 (1973) (seeking recognition of a First 
Amendment right of access to federal prisons). 
 58. E.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978) (seeking access to 
judicial records). 
 59. E.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563 (1978) (seeking recognition of at least 
a qualified privilege under the First Amendment against enforcement of newsroom searches). 
 60. E.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1976) (arguing that a statute 
giving political candidates a right to reply in any newspaper to criticism of them was 
unconstitutional). 
 61. It is not uncommon for these arguments to prevail.  Most state courts now recognize 
some constitutional or common law protections for journalists, and most federal courts also 
recognize at least a qualified reporter’s privilege.  See generally Reporter’s Privilege: 
Compendium, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, available at 
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Media lawyers found support for their claims from Supreme 
Court Justice Potter Stewart, whose 1974 speech at Yale Law School, 
later published as a law review article,62 provoked considerable 
scholarly reflection on the meaning of the Press Clause63 and whether 
it provides a set of rights separate from those guaranteed by the 
Speech Clause.64  In particular, media lawyers clung to Stewart’s 
suggestion that the Press Clause uniquely protects the institution of 
the press—by which he meant the “daily newspapers and other 
established news media”65—that are not provided to all other citizens 
under the Speech Clause.  The Speech Clause merely protects citizens’ 
right of free expression.  The Press Clause, however, has a separate 
purpose.  The Clause provides the press with the freedom not only to 
publish but also to seek out the news and to serve as a “fourth 
institution outside the Government [acting] as an additional check on 
the three official branches.”66  By using the words “or of the press” the 
Framers meant something, Stewart argued, otherwise the Press Clause 
would be “a constitutional redundancy.”67  Critics of Stewart 
challenged this idea, because it would authorize a tiered system of 
rights, would require judges to define who is a journalist, and could 
potentially lead to public demands that the press abide by certain 
ethical standards.68  As Justice White noted in Branzburg, this is a 
“questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that 
liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses 
carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large 
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition 
methods.”69 
The Supreme Court has largely, but not entirely, rejected the idea 
of special rights for the press. Although Justice White’s opinion in 
Branzburg argued against any special accommodations, the Court’s 
subsequent decisions in a series of libel cases implied that a different 
 
http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/index.php (listing various legal protections for journalists in 
jurisdictions across the country). 
 62. Stewart, supra note 38, at 631. 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . 
the press.”) 
 64. Id. 
 65. Stewart, supra note 38, at 631. 
 66. Id. at 634. 
 67. Id. at 633. 
 68. See Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privilege 
for the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629 (1979); Van Alstyne, supra note 38. 
 69. 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972). 
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set of constitutional standards might be required for the press.  In 
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, the Court held that “the common-
law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a 
plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public 
concern.”70  The Court used similar language in other media-related 
cases as well.71  By singling out media defendants, the Court seemed to 
suggest that they are empowered with additional protections.  This 
contradicts the egalitarian spirit of Branzburg, as well as most of the 
Court’s subsequent rulings, including Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.72  In 
Cohen, the Court held that when journalists break their promises of 
confidentiality to sources, they can be sued for damages under the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel73 without upsetting the First 
Amendment:74 
“[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the 
application of general laws.  He has no special privilege to invade 
the rights of others.” Accordingly, enforcement of such laws against 
the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to 
enforcement against other persons or organizations.75 
 
 70. 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 71. See Milcovich v. Loraine Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (“[A] statement on 
matters of public concern must be provable as false . . . at least in situations, like the present, 
where a media defendant is involved.” (emphasis added)); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469, 499 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the law prohibits states “from imposing 
strict liability for media publication of allegedly false statements” (emphasis added)); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (making repeated references to the interests of “media” 
defendants in libel cases); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 44 n.12 (1971) (“We 
expressly leave open the question of what constitutional standard of proof, if any, controls the 
enforcement of state libel laws for defamatory falsehoods published or broadcast by news 
media.” (emphasis added)). 
 72. 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991). 
 73. Promissory estoppel is “the principle that a promise made without consideration may 
nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should have reasonably expected 
the promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee did actually rely on the promise to his 
or her detriment.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 571 (7th ed. 1999). 
 74. In this case, an aide to a Republican gubernatorial candidate approached reporters for 
both the Minneapolis Star Tribune and the St. Paul Pioneer Press to offer “damaging” 
information about the opposing candidate, provided they not identify him as the source of the 
information.  Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665–66.  The reporters agreed, but their editors overrode their 
promises of confidentiality, believing that the information was so inconsequential that the public 
deserved to know both the information and who provided it.  Id. (The opposing candidate had 
once been charged with stealing $6 worth of sewing supplies, and the conviction was later 
vacated.). 
 75. Id. at 670 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937)) (alterations 
in the original) (emphasis added). 
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This view certainly has some appeal.  Special status is inconsistent 
with the constitutional premise of equality under law.76  Less clear is 
whether the general applicability of a law is all that need be 
considered.  Justice David Souter, joined by Justices Harry Blackman, 
Thurgood Marshall, and Sandra Day O’Connor, argued in dissent in 
Cohen: 
Thus “there is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general 
applicability,” for such laws may restrict First Amendment rights 
just as effectively as those directed specifically at speech itself.  
Because I do not believe the fact of general applicability to be 
dispositive, I find it necessary to articulate, measure, and compare 
the competing interests involved.77 
The Court’s unwillingness to weigh these contextual factors and 
its disregard of the broader principle of autonomy are apparent in 
several other cases as well.  In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court 
held that the First Amendment does not shield a news organization 
from having its offices searched pursuant to a valid warrant because 
the Fourth Amendment provides adequate protection against any 
unreasonable interference.78  The staff of the Stanford Daily would 
surely disagree, as would the lawyers for the New York Times who, 
nearly twenty years after Zurcher, were unable to prevent the federal 
government from seizing reporters’ phone records in the Islamic 
charities case.79  That case provides just one recent example of the 
inadequacy of the Fourth Amendment as a shield against government 
usurpations of media independence.80 
 
 76. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall deprive any person of . . . the 
equal protection of the laws.”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) 
(“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.”).  This principle is 
given force through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and has also 
been upheld in the First Amendment context.  See Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 
U.S. 221, 234 (1987) (invalidating a state tax that targeted only certain types of publications); 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592–93 (1983) 
(striking down a use tax on ink and paper because it singled out the print press for disparate 
treatment). 
 77. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 677 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Employment Div., Dept. of 
Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990)) (internal citation omitted). 
 78. 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978).  The Court did suggest, however, that search warrants 
targeting the press be reviewed with “‘scrupulous exactitude.’”  Id. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. 
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)). 
 79. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 80. Largely in response to Zurcher, Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act, which 
shields news organizations against searches or seizures of most work products or documentary 
materials.  This law does not prohibit searches or subpoenas of third parties, however.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000aa (1980). 
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The Court applied a similar framework in Herbert v. Lando when 
it held that news organizations have no First Amendment privilege to 
refuse to respond to inquiries by plaintiffs in libel cases about the 
organization’s editorial decision-making processes.81  Anyone suing 
for defamation must prove that the allegedly defamatory statements 
were published with fault, which is difficult to do without knowing 
what information the journalists knew or had access to prior to 
publication.82  But the Court again took this neutrality principle to the 
extreme, seeing no threats to editorial autonomy by litigants being 
able to probe the details of news organizations’ private editorial 
meetings, discussions, and processes.83  Instead of recognizing the risk 
of abuse and at a minimum establishing a qualified protection,84 the 
Court treated the media’s autonomy arguments as little more than 
brazen demands for special status.85 
The Court’s application of a rigid, no-special-rights template and 
its unwillingness to recognize the media’s claims as attempts to 
vindicate public rights rather than plots to secure private protections86 
are two of the central flaws of the Court’s newsgathering 
jurisprudence.  These flaws are all the more conspicuous now that 
changes in the media marketplace have eroded the press–public 
distinction.87  That should have been recognized in Cohen in 1991; 
instead, the Court again refused to make any allowance for context 
and treated the media’s claims as largely self-serving.88 
In Cohen, the Court echoed earlier precedents in holding that 
journalists have no constitutional protection against the application of 
“generally applicable laws” regardless of how substantially they might 
impair newsgathering or dissemination.89  This is facially 
 
 81. 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979). 
 82. Id. at 156–57. 
 83. Id. at 171–74. 
 84. Justice Brennan suggested as much in his dissenting opinion, arguing that plaintiffs 
should be forced to demonstrate that a publication is both false and defamatory before inquiring 
into a communicator’s editorial processes.  Id. at 197–198. 
 85. Id. at 165–69. 
 86. See infra Part I.B. 
 87. The proliferation of weblogs and other inexpensive online communications media has 
enabled those without traditional credentials and training to compete with mainstream news 
outlets.  This has triggered considerable debate over the question of who is a journalist.  See 
generally Ugland & Henderson, supra note 39. 
 88. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669–70. 
 89. Id. at 670 (“It is therefore beyond dispute that ‘[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no 
special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the 
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unremarkable.  But the Cohen decision, building off of Branzburg, 
Zurcher, and Herbert, provided the foundation for dozens of lawsuits 
over the past fifteen years in which plaintiffs have sued news 
organizations, not over what was published or broadcast, but over the 
methods used in gathering the information.90  By targeting the media’s 
newsgathering behavior, plaintiffs have—with mixed success—
avoided the formidable constitutional shield that protects media 
expression.91 
The best exemplar is Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,92 
which involved a civil suit by the Food Lion grocery chain against 
ABC over its “Prime Time Live” undercover investigation of 
unsanitary conditions at Food Lion stores.93  After lying on their job 
applications and getting hired as Food Lion employees, ABC 
reporters used hidden cameras and microphones to document 
unhealthy and illegal food handling practices.94  Food Lion brought 
suit for fraud, trespass, unfair trade practices, and breach of the duty 
of loyalty, but did not sue for defamation.95  Food Lion knew it would 
be easier to sue on those grounds and still persuade a sympathetic 
 
rights and liberties of others.’” (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–133 
(1937) (alteration in original))). 
 90. Buoyed by the “generally applicable laws” rationale from Cohen, many plaintiffs have 
since sued journalists under various theories, see, e.g., W.D.I.A. Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 34 
F. Supp. 2d 612, 614 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (fraud); Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 
584 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (trespass); Ruzika v. Conde Nast Publ’n, Inc., 999 
F.2d 1319, 1320 (8th Cir. 1993) (promissory estoppel); Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 
101 (1st Cir. 2000) (misrepresentation); Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475 (Cal. 
1998) (intrusion); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186 (D. 
Ariz. 1998)) (tortious interference with contract); Berger v. Cable News Network, No. CV 94-
46-BLG-JDS, 1996 WL 390528, at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 26, 1996) (conversion); and several other 
civil causes of action.  These suits have targeted a variety of journalistic activities—police “ride-
alongs,” the use of hidden cameras and microphones, the use of deception to uncover news, and 
the use of stolen documents or information in news reports. 
 91. See, e.g., Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (where plaintiff sued for 
intrusion instead of libel after ABC aired a hidden-camera investigation of plaintiff’s telephone 
psychic hotline business, ultimately eliciting a $900,000 settlement from the defendant).  But see 
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding ABC liable for 
trespass and breach of the duty of loyalty in their undercover investigation of Food Lion grocery 
stores, but refusing to award any damages related to the broadcast itself). 
 92. Food Lion, 194 F.3d 505. 
 93. Id. at 510. 
 94. Id. at 510–11. 
 95. Id. at 510. 
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jury to award punitive damages.96  The strategy worked and Food Lion 
won at the trial court level.97 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that, although journalists are 
not immune from liability for the torts they commit in their pursuit of 
news,98 the First Amendment prevents awarding damages based on 
what they publish or broadcast.99  This was a victory for the press 
because plaintiffs like Food Lion are less likely to sue if they are 
constitutionally prohibited from recovering publication-related 
damages. But the court left the door open to these kinds of suits by 
not offering any First Amendment protection for newsgathering 
activity,100 as opposed to the subsequent publication, and by not 
foreclosing the ability of plaintiffs to obtain punitive damages for de 
minimus tort violations.101  The crux of Food Lion is that the First 
Amendment protects journalists in their expressive function, but it 
does not protect them against civil liability in their newsgathering or 
investigative function. 
In 2000, the Fourth Circuit reinforced this view in the criminal 
case of United States. v. Matthews.102  The court held that radio 
producer Larry Matthews did not have constitutional immunity to 
download child pornography from the Internet, despite his claim that 
he was doing research for a freelance news story.103  Several news 
organizations supported Matthews’ appeals, arguing, like the four 
 
 96. See id. at 522. 
 97. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997).  The 
jury awarded Food Lion $1,402 in compensatory damages and over $5 million in punitive 
damages, id. at 927, later reduced by the court to $315,000, id. at 939.  The Fourth Circuit 
reversed in part, holding that by allowing Food Lion to sue for non-reputational torts while still 
allowing the broadcast to be considered in the calculation of damages, Food Lion was doing an 
end run around the First Amendment. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 524. 
 98. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 520 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)). 
 99. Id. at 522–24. 
 100. The court did cite the Supreme Court’s statement in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972), that newsgathering activity does enjoy some protection, but like the Branzburg Court, 
the Fourth Circuit did not elaborate on what activities that right protects or how far it extends.  
Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 520 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681). 
 101. Although the court rejected the availability of publication damages, it would be 
difficult, as a practical matter, for jurors not to consider at least subconsciously what was 
published or broadcast when calculating punitive damages.  Indeed, one of the Food Lion jurors 
said after the trial that she wanted to award the grocery company $1 billion in damages.  See 
Linda Lightfoot, Editors Hear the Roar of the Food Lion Case, AM. SOC’Y OF NEWSPAPER 
EDITORS, Jan. 1, 1997, available at http://www.asne.org/kiosk/editor/97.jan-feb/lightfoot1.htm.  
So, one could argue that the court’s limitation on publication damages is only a modest, and 
perhaps illusory, safeguard against tort suits aimed at journalists’ newsgathering. 
 102. 209 F.3d 338, 339 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 (2000). 
 103. Id. 
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dissenters in Cohen,104 that it is insufficient to simply say journalists 
are not above the law and end the analysis there.105  Courts must go 
further in considering context to ensure that the enforcement of 
otherwise valid criminal laws does not unduly restrain First 
Amendment interests.  Nevertheless, courts have consistently rejected 
a First Amendment defense in cases involving journalists’ alleged 
criminal behavior.106 
The lower court decisions in civil cases are far from uniform.  In 
intrusion cases,107 some courts, cognizant of the special-rights dilemma 
posed by the Court in Branzburg, have built their opinions entirely 
around the no-immunity principle.108 Other courts have better 
appreciated the First Amendment implications of these suits and the 
need to preserve those interests by narrowing the public’s legally 
enforceable zone of privacy.109  Similarly, in trespass cases,110 some 
 
 104. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 105. Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellant Seeking Reversal at 1, 10, United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (No. 99-4183).  The Reporters Committee was joined by the Society of Professional 
Journalists, National Public Radio and the Radio-Television News Directors Association.  Id. at 
iv. They argued that: 
when an individual engaged in constitutionally protected activity, such as 
newsgathering, violates a law that directly affects that protected activity, and the 
violation does not cause the harm the law seeks to proscribe, that individual should be 
allowed to argue at trial as an affirmative defense that the First Amendment protects 
his actions. 
Id. at 5. 
 106. Reporters have been charged, and their First Amendment defenses have been rejected, 
in cases involving criminal trespass, Stahl v. Oklahoma, 665 P.2d 839, 840 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1983), criminal harassment, Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 991–92 (2d Cir. 1973), and 
disorderly conduct, City of Oak Creek v. King, 436 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Wis. 1989), among many 
others.  The Supreme Court reiterated this principle in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 
(2001), but added that while a person can be punished for illegally obtaining information, the 
subsequent publication of that information by a third party is protected by the First 
Amendment, provided it is of public interest and the disseminating party played no role in the 
illegal acquisition.  Id. at 525, 533–34. 
 107. Intrusion is one of the four common-law privacy torts identified first by Prosser and 
recognized to varying degrees by state courts.  WILLIAM PROSSER, PROSSER’S HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (1971).  The others are public disclosure of private facts, 
appropriation and false light.  Id.  According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a person 
who “intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another 
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for [intrusion], if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. 
 108. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (“The First 
Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the 
precincts of another’s home or office.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 217–18 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
plaintiff did not have reasonable expectation that her conversations with others during an 
outdoor memorial service at a cemetery would be private); Deteresa v. ABC, Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 
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courts have refused to award damages on First Amendment grounds 
where the plaintiff has suffered no apparent harm,111 while other 
courts have awarded nominal damages in such cases.112  Results are 
also mixed in fraud cases.  Some courts have dismissed these cases 
where the plaintiff has not suffered direct harm113 and other courts 
have allowed them to go forward even in the absence of any 
demonstrable injury.114 
Courts that refuse to recognize the rights of newsgatherers in 
these contexts make three key mistakes.  The first is that these courts 
tend to characterize the claims of defendants as all-or-nothing appeals 
for blanket immunity.115  What most proponents of newsgathering 
protections seek, however, is not “a license . . . to violate valid criminal 
laws,”116 but the creation of some evidentiary barrier that plaintiffs 
and prosecutors would have to surmount before liability (in the civil 
context) or guilt (in the criminal context) could be found.117  Much 
 
466 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1137 (1998) (finding that plaintiff did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when she was being questioned at the front door of her house, 
which was visible to the street); Stressman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687 
(Iowa 1987) (holding that a woman did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public 
restaurant).  However, courts are still somewhat divided about what constitutes a public place.  
See Cassidy v. ABC, Inc., 377 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that the surreptitious 
recording of a police officer’s undercover investigation of a massage parlor was newsworthy and 
concluding that “no right of privacy against intrusion can be said to exist with reference to the 
gathering and dissemination of news concerning [an officer’s] discharge of public duties”). 
Compare McCall v. Courier Journal and Louisville-Times Co., 609 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1980), rev’d on other grounds, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981) (holding that an attorney could not 
sustain an intrusion claim against a client who surreptitiously recorded their conversation in her 
office), with Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 71, 73–74 (Cal. 1999) (holding that employees 
have at least a limited expectation of privacy in their workplace). 
 110. See Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1998) (“A person commits trespass when that person enters another’s land without consent.” 
(citing Copeland v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 402, 403 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995))). 
 111. Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 99-1158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23128, at *8–9 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2001). 
 112. Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 681 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1998). 
 113. See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1190–91 (D.Ariz. 
1998); Homsy v. King World Entm’t, Inc., No. 01-96-00708-CV, 1997 WL 52154, at *5 (Tex. 
App. Feb. 6, 1997). 
 114. See, e.g., Special Force Ministries, 584 N.W.2d at 794. 
 115. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682–683 (1972) (“It is clear that the First 
Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from 
the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes . . . .”); United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp. 293, 
296–297 (D.N.J. 1993) (“It is naïve to blindly acknowledge or adopt the unfettered First 
Amendment freedoms espoused by the press . . . .”). 
 116. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691. 
 117. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Sigman L. Splichal & Sheree Martin, Triggering the First 
Amendment: Newsgathering Torts and Press Freedom, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273, 294 (1999) 
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like the libel context, where liability only attaches when some level of 
fault is proved, similar safeguards in the newsgathering context would 
protect journalists unless plaintiffs or prosecutors could demonstrate 
a superior interest.  The construction of the First Amendment 
proposed in this Article does not put newsgathering behavior in a 
special category.  But because many of the civil tort claims and some 
of the criminal prosecutions targeting newsgathering are so prone to 
abuse,118 some protection ought to be recognized—not to immunize 
journalists’ investigative activity, but to prevent subtle and indirect 
assaults on expressive activity. 
The second key problem with the courts’ treatment of these cases 
is that they expressly or impliedly characterize the defendants’ claims 
as demands for special rights.119  But the media litigants in 
newsgathering cases have routinely made clear that they are seeking 
judicial recognition of protections claimable by all people who gather 
 
(arguing that, in newsgathering tort cases, “the plaintiff must establish a compelling interest in 
vindicating the common-law newsgathering claim alleged”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the 
Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1143, 1162 (1999–2000) (proposing that tort claims aimed at newsgathering be subjected to 
at least intermediate constitutional scrutiny—that is, newsgathering should be protected “unless 
it can be proven that there is an important interest gained by allowing liability”); Paul A. LeBel, 
The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment Protection from Tort 
Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145, 1154–55 (1995–
1996) (suggesting that newsgathering activity be treated as constitutionally parallel to 
publication and a balancing approach be applied to newsgathering-related tort claims, much like 
the courts have balanced the competing interests involved in libel and privacy cases). 
 118. These suits can be used as a pretext to seek compensation for the harms associated with 
a publication or broadcast, allowing the plaintiff to skirt the First Amendment shield that 
protects expression.  This kind of tactic has been repudiated by the Supreme Court in a slightly 
different context.  See Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (rejecting attempt by plaintiff to 
seek reputation-related damages by suing for intentional infliction of emotional distress rather 
than libel).  See also Nathan Siegel, Commentary, Newsgathering and Privacy Rights, 1999 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 207, 215 (1999) (“[E]ven though [Food Lion] was supposed to be an issue about a 
generally applicable law, no one, neither Food Lion nor ABC, could find a single precedent . . . 
where any company had ever tried to assert that kind of claim against any one of its entry-level 
employees. That suggests to me that we’re not really dealing here with general laws. Rather, 
we’re dealing here with an attempt to bend the law to try to find a basis to sue over news 
reports.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 n.1 (1979) (noting that the Court’s prior 
rulings “provide no support for the theory that the prepublication editorial process enjoys a 
special status under the First Amendment”); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 570 (1978) 
(“[T]here is no justification for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment procedure 
for the press . . . .”) (Powell, J., concurring); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“The 
Constitution does not . . . require government to accord the press special access to information . 
. . .”); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We do not see why there need to 
be special criteria merely because the possessor of the documents or other evidence sought is a 
journalist.”) (emphasis added). 
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and disseminate news, not merely those employed by traditional news 
organizations.  The special-rights dilemma, then, is largely illusory, at 
least when operating under an egalitarian definition of the press.120 
B. Defining “The Press” 
Those opposed to recognizing a constitutionally distinct status for 
journalists or the press point to the difficulty of defining the types of 
people or organizations that ought to be able to claim those 
protections.121  As Justice White wrote in Branzburg, trying to define 
who is a journalist would “present practical and conceptual difficulties 
of a high order.”122  It is possible to avoid the definitional problem of 
who is a journalist, but it would require reversing decisions by each of 
the federal courts that have recognized the journalist’s privilege, and 
it would require rewriting dozens of state and federal laws that give 
journalists special dispensations.123  Irrespective of the constitutional 
validity of special rights, the contemporary reality is that such 
protections exist and cannot be effectively implemented in the 
absence of a definition.  The question is no longer whether 
“journalist” or “the press” should be defined, but how. 
Several criteria could apply in forming a definition.  Looking to 
membership in professional associations might help, but because 
journalists are not licensed like doctors and lawyers, many qualified 
journalists might not seek such memberships.  Education is another 
possibility, but certainly there are excellent reporters and editors who 
do not have journalism degrees.  Employment could likewise be the 
operative criterion.  Under the New York shield law, for example, one 
must be a “professional journalist”—that is, someone working as a 
 
 120. See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 39.  See also infra Part I.B. 
 121. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(“Are we then to create a privilege that protects only those reporters employed by Time 
Magazine, the New York Times, and other media giants, or do we extend that protection as well 
to the owner of a desktop printer producing a weekly newsletter?”) (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
 122. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972). 
 123. See discussion of shield laws, supra notes 22, 51.  In addition to shield laws, many 
freedom of information laws allow for waivers of photocopying and search fees related to 
records requests by journalists.  E.g., The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2002) (“[F]ees shall be limited to reasonable standard charges . . . when 
records are not sought for commercial use and the request is made by . . . a representative of the 
news media . . . .”).  Many states also have retraction statutes that require libel plaintiffs suing 
news organizations to first seek a retraction before filing suit.  E.g., WIS. STAT. § 895.05(2) 
(“Before any civil action shall be commenced on account of any libelous publication . . . the 
libeled person shall first give those alleged to be responsible or liable for the publication a 
reasonable opportunity to correct the libelous matter.”). 
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journalist “for gain or livelihood.”124  But this definition eliminates 
anyone supplying news who does not receive a paycheck, including 
many freelancers and most bloggers.  Another possible basis for a 
definition could be the type of organization involved.  But would a 
reporter for the New York Times count and not someone who writes 
for a trade publication or People magazine?  Protections could be 
limited to traditional news media, but would it make sense to grant 
privileges to a reporter from National Review and not one from 
Talking Points Memo?  Another approach would be to define 
journalists based on the function they are performing.  The reporter’s 
privilege could be made available to anyone serving a press 
function—seeking out news of public interest for the purpose of 
disseminating it to an audience—whether or not the person possesses 
any of the other attributes or affiliations described above. 
Courts have not reached a consensus about the shape that a 
definition should take.  The Supreme Court has provided little 
guidance, and the lower court approaches and statutory definitions 
are inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary.125  The definition proposed 
here is built around the last of the criteria discussed above—function.  
This seems to be the direction favored by most circuit courts,126 and it 
is the only approach that can be squared with the ethos of equality 
that pervades the Constitution.127  At its core, newsgathering is simply 
collecting information for the purpose of presenting it to an audience.  
Although employees of mainstream news organizations most often 
undertake this task, there is nothing to prevent a non-traditional 
journalist or an ambitious do-it-yourselfer from engaging in the same 
activity with the same intentions and achieving the same result.  
Because all people have the ability to serve this investigative 
function—whether or not they have any relevant training, experience 
 
 124. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (a)(6) (2007). 
 125. For example, many state shield laws only protect those who are “salaried employees” 
of a news organization.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1)(a) (2007).  Many retraction statutes 
only protect print publications.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 895.05(02) (2006).  And some laws, like 
one of the earlier versions of the proposed federal shield law, which was never enacted into law, 
would not cover those working solely for Web-only organizations.  H.R. 3323 § 5(2), 109th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). 
 126. See, e.g., von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987) (affording the 
privilege to one who has “the intent to use the material—sought, gathered or received—to 
disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of the 
newsgathering process”). 
 127. See infra text accompanying notes 213–216. 
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or credentials—these prerogatives should not belong to a preferred 
class. 
This does not, however, mean that all citizens should be able to 
refuse to comply with subpoenas.  This protection should belong 
solely to those serving a press function.  Such individuals would be 
those (1) engaged in the process of gathering information of public 
significance, (2) for the purpose of communicating it to an audience, 
(3) with the intent at the start of the newsgathering process to 
distribute the information to others, and (4) whose compliance with 
the government’s demand would pose a legitimate risk of impairing 
their future expressive or newsgathering activity.  This proposed 
definition avoids the special-rights problem by providing protection 
to anyone whose actions serve the purposes of press freedom.  The 
definition also acknowledges the democratizing and decentralizing 
role played by the Internet and other new media technology.  And, 
perhaps most importantly, it is a definition that does not require any 
judicial improvisation, but flows naturally from the sequential 
interpretation of the First Amendment applied here. 
Should the Supreme Court revisit the reporter’s privilege issue, it 
ought to recognize that the egalitarian conception of the press 
envisaged by Justice White in Branzburg128 is not the bane of the 
privilege, but its salvation.  By distributing these protections based on 
the functions newsgatherers perform instead of their characteristics, 
credentials, or professional affiliations, the Court would solve the 
special-rights problem and simplify the definitional dilemma.  The 
only remaining challenge for journalists would be to convince the 
Court that the reporter’s privilege—as well as the protections sought 
in Zurcher,129 Herbert,130 and Cohen131—can be recognized without 
doing damage to the rest of the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Those protections are necessary to preserve the 
autonomy of those who gather and disseminate news and are, unlike 
the access cases described next, not merely affirmative rights 
(privileges, in the truer sense of the word) but negative rights—shields 
 
 128. 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972) (“The informative function asserted by representatives of the 
organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, 
academic researchers, and dramatists.”). 
 129. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 130. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
 131. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
04__UGLAND_FINAL.DOC 7/23/2008  9:34:02 AM 
2008] DEMARCATING THE RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS 139 
against intrusions by the government into journalists’ processes, 
property, and private relationships.132 
C. Affirmative v. Negative Rights 
As with the other questions addressed above, there is a similar 
absence of uniformity regarding whether the First Amendment 
provides merely a negative barrier against government intrusions or 
also provides a set of affirmative rights—rights of access to places and 
information, for example. Affirmative rights in this context are those 
that protect actions aimed at uncovering, rather than disseminating 
information. Negative rights protect people from government 
encroachment on their liberties—both their expression and, it is 
suggested here, their autonomy.133 
In the 1970s and 1980s, some journalists and First Amendment 
advocates sought judicial recognition of a constitutional right of 
access built around a nebulous right-to-know principle.134  The 
Supreme Court had previously frustrated these efforts in Zemel v. 
Rusk, holding that the government can limit the countries to which 
American citizens may travel.135  But in Lamont v. Postmaster General 
of the United States,136 the Court struck down Post Office rules 
permitting the destruction of “communist propaganda” sent through 
the mails, holding that the rules violated the First Amendment rights 
of the intended recipient.137  In so holding, the Court acknowledged a 
limited right to receive information, which it affirmed and extended in 
 
 132. For more on the affirmative–negative distinction, see supra notes 40, 55. 
 133. Some scholars propose an affirmative rights model with a decidedly different focus.  
They argue that freedom of speech and press are rights that the public possesses, not merely 
against government infringement but against all infringement, and that the government is free 
to advance people’s expressive opportunities even if doing so requires limiting the speech of 
some (for example, the mainstream media) for the broader use and benefit of the many.  See, 
e.g., JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?  340–43 (Indiana Univ. Press 
1973).  The Supreme Court has rejected this view, most notably in Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974), striking down a statute that required newspapers to give 
political candidates a right of reply. 
 134. David Mitchell Ivester, Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 109 (1977); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 1 (1976). 
 135. 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
 136. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 137. Id. at 305 (construing Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, 39 
U.S.C. § 4008(a) (2000), which required destruction of unsealed materials deemed to be 
communist propaganda unless the intended recipient submitted a reply card indicating his or 
her desire to receive the materials). 
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subsequent cases.138  However, the Court was only recognizing a 
negative right against government interference with the exchange of 
information by private citizens.  In a series of rulings in the 1970s 
involving access to prisons—a more clearly affirmative-rights 
context—the Court was far more skeptical.  In Saxbe v. Washington 
Post Co.139 and Pell v. Procunier,140 the Court held that neither 
journalists nor the public have a First Amendment right of access to 
prisons.141  In Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,142 another case involving prison 
access, the Supreme Court added, “This Court has never intimated a 
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of 
information within government control.”143  In these cases, the Court 
referenced its earlier ruling in Adderley v. Florida,144 in which it held 
that “the State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to 
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated.”145  Most lower courts have followed suit, limiting 
press and public rights of access to places where their presence would 
not interfere with the intended use of the property, although the 
courts’ rulings and rationales in these contexts are far from uniform.146 
After Houchins, the campaign for affirmative rights of access was 
moribund.  But just two years later, the Court took an extraordinary 
step in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,147 holding that the 
public and press have a First Amendment right to attend criminal 
 
 138. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 757 (1976) (concluding that “[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to 
receive the advertising . . . .”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (“In a variety of 
contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to ‘receive information and 
ideas.’”) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).  The principle was also 
supported in a case prior to Lamont, 381 U.S. 301.  See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 143 (1943) (“[The First Amendment] embraces the right to distribute literature . . . and 
necessarily protects the right to receive it.”) (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)). 
 139. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
 140. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).   
 141. Saxbe, U.S. at 849–50 (1974); Pell, U.S. at 833 (1974). The Court in Pell also addressed 
the special-rights question, holding that “newsmen have no constitutional right of access to 
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.” Id. at 834. 
 142. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 143. Id. at 9. 
 144. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 145. Id. at 47. 
 146. Compare J.B. Pictures, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 86 F.3d. 236, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(upholding federal regulation excluding the press and public from the area of Dover Air Force 
Base where bodies of dead soldiers are returned), with Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 
465, 471 (D.N.H. 1990) (holding that a freelance photographer’s First Amendment rights were 
violated by police order that he stop taking photos of an accident scene). 
 147. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
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trials.148  The Court emphasized the fact that in Great Britain and the 
United States, courtrooms have for centuries been open to the public 
and that access serves vital democratic purposes.  “People in an open 
society do not demand infallibility from their institutions,” the Court 
held, “but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited 
from observing.”149  Because criminal trials have historically been 
open to the public, and because access helps ensure the fairness of 
these proceedings, the Court concluded that they are presumptively 
open.150  The Court in Richmond thus established an affirmative right 
of access that was supported by two key rationales: history and 
function.151 
Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,152 the 
Court struck down a law that peremptorily mandated closure of trials 
in which minor victims of sexual assaults would be testifying.153  In 
1984, the Court extended the presumption of access to the jury 
selection process in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press 
Enterprise I),154 holding that closure of voir dire would only be 
constitutional if the closure order were “narrowly tailored” and 
served an “overriding interest.”155  In 1986, the Court held that the 
presumption of access also applies to preliminary hearings in Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise II),156 and that the 
presumptive openness of judicial proceedings depends on the two 
factors highlighted in Richmond: (1) whether the proceeding “ha[s] 
historically been open to the press and general public,”157 and (2) 
“whether public access plays a significant role in the functioning of 
 
 148. Id. at 580.  There is only a presumptive right of access, however.  The Court 
acknowledged that there might be countervailing interests that are sufficiently compelling to 
justify closure.  Id. at 598. 
 149. Id. at 572. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. The Court has also used the term “logic” instead of “function” to refer to this part 
of the test.  See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct. for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 606 
(1982) (“In sum, the institutional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and 
experience.”) (emphasis added). 
 152. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596. 
 153. There may be times when privacy interests supersede access rights, the Court held, but 
the presumption must be openness, and closure must only be permitted where the government 
can demonstrate that it serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.  Id. at 607–08. 
 154. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
 155. Id. at 510. 
 156. 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). This case actually involved a request for the transcript of a 
preliminary hearing that had previously been closed.  Id. 
 157. Id. 
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the particular process in question.”158  If a proceeding is held to be 
presumptively open, access can only be denied by satisfying the strict-
scrutiny test outlined in Press Enterprise II. 159 
The presumption of access to most criminal proceedings has been 
reinforced by dozens of lower-court decisions.160  But there is a 
significant discrepancy in the way courts have applied the function 
component of Richmond.  The Court in Richmond held that judges 
should look at whether the functioning of the proceeding in question 
would be significantly aided by open access.161  The holding suggests 
that, in some cases, access is essential to the proper administration of 
justice, not merely because it enhances public understanding of the 
courts and court proceedings, but also because it directly affects the 
integrity of the proceedings themselves.162  Some lower courts have 
paid less attention to this aspect of Richmond and have required 
public access largely because it enhances citizens’ knowledgeable 
participation in civic life.163  The Supreme Court may have encouraged 
this kind of interpretation by its own emphasis on this public benefit 
in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court: “[B]y offering [access], the 
First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can 
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. In its most recent court-access case, El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 
(1993), the Court added that when considering whether a proceeding has historically been open, 
courts should not focus on the unique traditions of a particular jurisdiction but rather on 
whether the type of proceeding has traditionally been open throughout the United States.  Id. at 
150. 
 160. Courts have declared a variety of criminal proceedings to be presumptively open.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557–58 (3d Cir. 1982) (suppression hearing); Seattle 
Times v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Wash., 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988) (bail 
hearings); State v. Eaton, 483 So.2d 651, 658–59 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (competency hearings); 
CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) (a post-
conviction proceeding on a defendant’s motion for a reduction his sentence); Soc’y of Prof’l 
Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 571 (D. Utah 1985) (administrative hearings).  
Grand jury proceedings are the primary exception to the presumption of openness.  See 
generally In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records, 864 
F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 161. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (“[Access] gave 
assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged 
perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See, e.g., Cable News Network, Inc. v. Amer. Broad. Cos., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (“[T]he rights guaranteed and protected by the First Amendment include a 
right of access to news or information concerning the operations and activities of government.  
This right is held by both the general public and the press, with the press acting as a 
representative or agent of the public as well as on its own behalf.  Without such a right, the goals 
and purposes of the First Amendment would be meaningless.”). 
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self-government.”164  This is undoubtedly true, but if it is the chief 
rationale upon which access is granted, there may be no principled 
basis for denying access to any government information or 
proceeding.  As the Supreme Court noted in the 1965 case, Zemel v. 
Rusk, “There are few restrictions on action which could not be 
clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.”165 
Although the Supreme Court and lower courts have correctly 
provided access to most criminal and civil166 court proceedings, to the 
extent that their rulings rely on the public-edification rationale 
instead of one focused on procedural fairness, the courts read into the 
First Amendment an anomalous right that is both impossible to 
confine to the context of judicial proceedings and inconsistent with 
the Court’s other First Amendment rulings that uniformly shape 
rights by a negative construction.167  If the function component is 
satisfied whenever access yields useful insights into government 
processes and decision-making, it is hard to know what prevents 
function from serving as an almost boundless mandate for direct 
public supervision of all government operations. 
Although journalists generally regard Richmond as one of the few 
unmovable pillars of First Amendment law—as vital to their work as 
Near v. Minnesota168 and New York Times v. Sullivan169—it is difficult to 
square its affirmative-rights construction with the Court’s other First 
 
 164. 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982). 
 165. 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965). 
 166. The Court has not addressed the question of access in the context of a civil proceeding, 
but it wrote in dicta in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 n.15 (1979), that access 
claims in those cases might be “as strong [or] stronger” than in many criminal cases.  Lower 
courts have regularly provided access to most civil proceedings, except those that implicate 
some overriding privacy interest—for example, cases involving divorce, custody, civil 
commitment, and adoption. 
 167. The Court has interpreted the First Amendment as a negative barrier against 
government encroachments or usurpations of the press’ editorial discretion, not as an 
affirmative command to supply it with information or access.  As Justice Potter Stewart 
suggested, “The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official 
Secrets Act.”  Stewart, supra note 38, at 636.  With the exception of the court access cases, see 
supra text accompanying notes 146–156, the Court has consistently rejected interpretations of 
the First Amendment that would put affirmative obligations on the government.  See, e.g., 
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 9–10, 14–16 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post. Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 
(1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834–35 (1974); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966); 
Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16 (1965). 
 168. 283 U.S. 697, 773, 735 (1931) (ruling that prior restraints of the press are presumptively 
unconstitutional). 
 169. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (ruling that public-official libel plaintiffs have the burden to prove 
that information published about them is false and that it was published with actual malice; that 
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity). 
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Amendment rulings.170  That is not to say that access to the courts has 
no constitutional basis.  But those rights are better recognized as 
components of procedural fairness guaranteed in other constitutional 
provisions, particularly the Sixth,171 Seventh,172 and to a lesser extent, 
Eighth Amendments.173  By recognizing an affirmative First 
Amendment right of access to the judiciary, the Court has muddied its 
First Amendment jurisprudence and facilitated the disparate rulings 
of lower courts.  The Court was right to acknowledge that access has 
edifying effects,174 but those are merely ancillary benefits of access, not 
compelling reasons for providing it.  What is a compelling rationale is 
that the legitimacy of most judicial proceedings is in fact preserved by 
access and undermined by its denial.  This is not true, at least not in 
the same way, in other contexts where access could be seen as 
useful.175 
The interpretation of the First Amendment proposed here does 
not recognize affirmative rights.  It does support public access to the 
judiciary, but under the umbrella of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth 
Amendments, not the First. This is the only approach that can resolve 
the incongruities spawned by Richmond and its progeny, and it is an 
approach that finds support in most of the traditional theories of 
constitutional interpretation, including the sequential approach 
applied in Part III. The interpretation proposed here is also built 
around a conception of affirmative rights that is different than the 
one applied by the Court.  The Court in Branzburg, Zurcher, Herbert, 
and Cohen seems to construe the claims of the media litigants as 
demands for special exemptions or immunities from the normal 
obligations of citizenship while minimizing the potentially suppressive 
 
 170. See supra note 163. 
 171. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 172. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”). 
 173. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 160. 
 175. The presence of the public provides external oversight of judicial proceedings and 
serves as a check against any mistakes or mischief that occurs there.  Although some of the same 
interests are served by access to the legislative process, the participants in those proceedings are 
more readily held accountable through the electoral process. 
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effects of government intrusions on journalists’ source relationships, 
editorial decision-making, and newsroom privacy.176  It works from a 
dichotomous framework in which direct restraints of expression are 
presumptively unconstitutional, but restraints of newsgathering and 
other behavior that are one step removed are, in most cases, 
permissible.177  The Court gives too little consideration to contextual 
issues in the application of generally applicable laws, and does not 
recognize or acknowledge that neutral laws can still breach the press’ 
autonomy and produce the same kinds of effects as content-based 
laws.178  The interpretation proposed here would realign those cases by 
applying a negative-rights construction of the First Amendment, but 
one that recognizes a negative right as protection against restrictions 
both on expressive activity and journalistic autonomy. 
II.  THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Before charting the dimensions of a right to gather news, one must 
identify some constitutional language from which the right can be said 
to originate.  Some say the First Amendment generally supports 
recognition of a right to gather news.179  Others, most notably Justice 
Potter Stewart, argue that those protections derive specifically from 
the Press Clause.180  Others insist that the Press and Speech Clauses 
are to be read together as a collective statement about the right of 
 
 176. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (“The sole issue before us is the 
obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do.”); Herbert v. 
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 155 (1979) (“[W]e are urged to hold for the first time that when a member 
of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to the 
plaintiff's reputation, the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial processes of those 
responsible for the publication.”); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) 
(“[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their 
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the 
news.”).  See also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (failing to address the First 
Amendment implications of newsroom searches). 
 177. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Newhouse Dedication Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 
176 (1979) (describing the Court’s two-track approach to evaluating speech and press 
controversies). 
 178. For example, the excessive use of subpoenas and newsroom searches, even though 
issued or conducted pursuant to a neutral law, could produce the same kind of “chilling effect” 
that the Court has emphasized in other First Amendment cases.  N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 300 (1964). 
 179. See, e.g., Branzbug, 408 U.S. at 681 (“[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”). 
 180. Stewart, supra note 38, at 633–34 (1975) (arguing that the Press Clause is a “structural 
provision” that protects “the institutional autonomy of the press”). 
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citizens to express themselves, whether through speech or through 
media.181 
These interpretive battles might have been unnecessary if not for 
James Madison’s verbal economy. The Speech and Press Clauses, 
about which millions of words have been written, consist of only 
fourteen.182  But because their meaning is not self-evident, it can only 
be said that the clauses protect certain behaviors and not others by 
offering some theory of constitutional interpretation to support that 
conclusion.  The sequential approach outlined here relies upon several 
familiar sources when interpreting constitutional provisions—text, 
history, structure, and context—all of which are necessary, but none is 
sufficient.  These sources are briefly described below and specifically 
applied to the First Amendment in Part III. 
A. Analysis of Text 
Text-focused approaches to judicial review seek answers to 
constitutional questions from the plain language of the Constitution.183  
Although the text provides clear answers to some constitutional 
questions—How old must someone be to run for president?184  How 
many years is each presidential term?185—most provisions require 
some extrapolation.  Phrases like “equal protection,” “due process,” 
and “the press” force even the most determined textualists to look 
beyond the document for guidance.186 
 
 181. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (dismissing the 
notion of a separate meaning for the Press Clause and arguing that the press merited separate 
mention by the Framers merely because “it had been more often the object of official 
restraints”). 
 182. See U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”). 
 183. See, e.g., Ofer Raban, The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of a Politicized Judiciary: A 
Philosophical Critique, 8 J.L. SOC’Y 114 (2007) (“[T]extualism limits legal interpretation (where 
possible) to literal linguistic constraints.”).  Justice Hugo Black declared himself to be a First 
Amendment absolutist, because he read that amendment as a literal prohibition of all restraints 
of individual expression.  See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., 
concurring) (“I read ‘no law . . . abridging’ to mean no law abridging.”).  Note, however, that 
Justice Black was willing to tolerate restraints of free expression when they were coupled with 
some kind of conduct.  See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines,  393 U.S. 503, 516 (Black, J., dissenting) 
(arguing against recognition of the speech rights of high school students who wore black 
armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War). 
 184. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 185. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 186. Justice Black, for example, who advocated a literal reading of the words of the 
Constitution as a way of concretizing and stabilizing its meaning and removing the discretion of 
judges to promote their own creative translations, was nevertheless overzealous in his claim to 
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Justice Hugo Black was perhaps the most celebrated textualist.  
He began serving on the Court during the ascendancy of judicial 
realism,187 a philosophy that he viewed as an assault on the legitimacy 
of the judiciary.188  Justice Black sought to restore some precision and 
neutrality to constitutional interpretation.  To this end, he argued that 
the Constitution is fundamentally a statement against excessive 
government intrusions into private domains,189 and that it was 
designed very deliberately to proclaim certain absolutes—or “thou 
shalt nots,” as Justice Black called them190—in circumscribing 
government.  Justice Black eschewed balancing formulas like the 
“clear and present danger test”191 that were too malleable in the hands 
of undisciplined judges.  Instead, he favored a more literal reading of 
the Constitution that put clear and immovable barriers at the feet of 
government officials.  Justice Black believed that this would better 
protect individual autonomy, provide greater consistency, and make 
the law, particularly the Constitution, understandable to all citizens.192 
By limiting judicial discretion, textualism minimizes what 
Alexander Bickel called the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”—the 
 
“merely [be] enforcing the plain meaning of plain words and [the] agreed-upon intent of the 
Framers.”  Sylvia Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, in JUSTICE BLACK AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 18 (Everette E. Dennis, Donald M. Gillmor & David L. Grey eds., Iowa State 
Univ. Press 1978).  As Snowiss points out, the very fact that there was, and remains, widespread 
disagreement about the plain meaning of many of these constitutional passages suggests that 
Justice Black’s claims about their certainty were overstated, whether or not they were 
disingenuous.  Id. at 17. 
 187. Underlying realism was the belief that judicial decision-making is inherently subjective, 
political and personal, and that there is no way to purify constitutional interpretation from the 
contaminating influence of judicial discretion. 
 188. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384–85 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“It can be . . 
. argued that when this Court strikes down a legislative act because it offends the idea of 
‘fundamental fairness,’ it furthers the basic thrust of our Bill or Rights . . . . But that argument 
ignores the effect of such decisions on perhaps the most fundamental individual liberty of our 
people—the right of each man to participate in the self-government of his society.”). 
 189. Edmond N. Cahn, Dimensions of First Amendment ‘Absolutes’: A Public Interview, in 
JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 41, 46 (Everette E. Dennis, Donald M. 
Gillmor & David L. Grey eds., Iowa State Univ. Press 1978) (“Why was a Constitution written 
for the first time in this country except to limit the power of government and those who were 
selected to exercise it at the moment?”). 
 190. Id. at 51. 
 191. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that government 
restrictions of speech are unconstitutional unless the “words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent”). 
 192. See Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme Court 
Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 198 (2002) (“As a self-conscious stylist, Black wanted 
his prose to be accessible to ordinary people because he wanted them to understand and 
appreciate for themselves the legal protections the Constitution provided.”). 
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seeming incongruity of judges being empowered to override the will 
of the majority, as expressed by Congress.193  But textualism presents 
other problems.  The Constitution’s text is rarely clear, and its 
meaning can change over time.  What is “cruel and unusual”194 in one 
century might be perfectly ordinary in another, for example.  Without 
some accommodation for the evolution of human experience, a literal 
interpretation of the Constitution would bind society to a set of 
definitions and values that have, in some cases, become archaic.  
Literalist interpretations also risk undermining the intent of the 
Framers.  The Seventh Amendment, for example, preserves the right 
to a jury trial for common law suits, but only when the “value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.”195  A literal interpretation 
that did not account for inflation would destroy that monetary 
limitation and defeat the original purpose of the provision.  The text, 
then, is the necessary starting point in constitutional interpretation, 
but an unadulterated textual analysis does not account for conflicts 
between text and intent and does not permit the Constitution to 
evolve in the face of new circumstances. 
B. Analysis of Intent 
Historical approaches to constitutional interpretation focus on the 
intent of the Constitution’s Framers, ratifiers, or both.  Strict 
historicists—also commonly referred to as originalists or 
intentionalists—believe judges should ascertain what the Framers 
intended each specific phrase of the Constitution to mean.196  
Moderate historicists are less interested in the contextual meaning of 
words and phrases and more interested in the Framers’ broader 
aims.197 
Historical approaches have intuitive appeal.  It seems self-evident 
that if the Constitution is the supreme law and the ultimate 
 
 193. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (Yale University Press 2d 
ed. 1986) (1962). 
 194. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 195. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 196. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18–23, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (relying 
on historical understandings of “cruel and unusual” to conclude that the Eighth Amendment 
only prohibits corporal punishments of prisoners that cause “serious injury”). 
 197. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”).  Here, the Court is concerned with intent but is focused on identifying the underlying 
principal and not ascertaining the contextual meaning of the words. 
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expression of the public will, it should be given the meaning intended 
by those who adopted it.  Yet historicists must inevitably confront the 
problems that accompany all historical inquiry.  Can an objective 
rendering of past eras ever be constructed—particularly for a period 
whose historiography is so steeped in patriotic sentiment and great-
person mythos?198  And can one discern the meaning of the 
Constitution or the intent of those who drafted and ratified it when 
there were so many participants and when the debate took place over 
so many years?  As constitutional historian Jack Rakove observes, the 
framing and ratifying of the Constitution “involved processes of 
collective decision-making whose outcomes necessarily reflected a 
bewildering array of intentions and expectations, hopes and fears, 
genuine compromises and agreements to disagree.”199 
Critics of historicism also suggest that its adherents either näively 
suppose or disingenuously contend that it is an apolitical, value-
neutral interpretive method.200  They argue instead that because 
people are naturally drawn to historical sources that are most 
compatible with individual viewpoints, and because people examine 
and perceive empirical evidence through their own peculiar lenses, 
portrayals of intent will always be imperfect.201  Historicism’s critics 
also ask why contemporary Americans should be beholden to the 
intentions of their long-deceased forbearers who, by virtue of being 
 
 198. The Great Person or Great Man approach to historical study focuses on the heroic and 
nefarious acts of individuals as the keys to understanding past eras.  This approach is seen by 
many contemporary historians as a failing of modern historiography—it is so tightly trained on 
individuals that it misses the more diffuse social forces that shaped particular events or periods.  
The traditional works examining the Revolutionary era, for example, are often criticized for 
their preoccupation with the founders—Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Madison, and the like.  
See HOWARD ZINN, Forward to RAY RAPHAEL, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (Perennial 2002) (arguing that this approach serves “the interests of the 
privileged and powerful, because, by ignoring ordinary people, it reinforces their feelings of 
powerlessness”). 
 199. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 6 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1996). 
 200. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s 
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 558 (2006) (“As a political practice, originalism 
has been nothing if not practical.  It has engaged in a perfectly ordinary effort to identify and 
appropriate a politically useable past by strategically selecting and resurrecting particular 
historical themes and events.  It has ignored elements of the original understanding that do not 
resonate with contemporary conservative commitments.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. 
& THEORY 3, 6 (1969) (“[T]hese models and preconceptions in terms of which we unavoidably 
organize and adjust our perceptions and thoughts will themselves tend to act as determinants of 
what we think or perceive.  We must classify in order to understand, and we can only classify the 
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar.”). 
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dead, are no longer stakeholders in American democracy.202  Non-
interpretivists203—those who espouse approaches that go beyond both 
history and intent—argue that historicism is in fact a status quo 
reinforcing approach that turns the Constitution into a static 
anachronism.204  The Constitution should be a living document, and to 
strictly adhere to the meanings intended by those who drafted and 
ratified it two centuries ago disempowers those who must abide by it 
today.205 
All of these are sound arguments, which is why historicist and 
interpretivist theories can never be relied upon exclusively.  But intent 
cannot be dismissed.  To do so is to undermine through judicial 
interpretation what the citizens of 1791 established through 
constitutional amendment.  And if their intent is not respected, it 
enfeebles both the amendment process and the larger democratic 
architecture.  The complexities that accompany these kinds of 
inquiries are inadequate reasons to abandon them.  This does not 
mean that the intent of the Framers with respect to discrete 
constitutional passages can ever be understood with mathematical 
precision.  But it is possible, particularly in the context of the First 
Amendment, to understand more general sentiments and to identify 
and exclude the most specious interpretations.206 
C. Analysis of Structure 
When clear meanings cannot be gleaned from text, intent, or both, 
some insights can be found in the broader design or structure of the 
 
 202. See infra note 205. 
 203. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 
(1975).  Grey distinguishes the “interpretive” model of constitutional interpretation—in which 
judges abide by the clear dictates of the text, animated by original intent—from the 
“noninterpretive model,” in which a court has an “additional role as the expounder of basic 
national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is 
not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution.”  Id. at 706. 
 204. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2005). 
 205. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Transcript of the University of Hawaii Law Review 
Symposium: Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 501, 507 (2000) (“I am 
skeptical of original meaning because it assumes that the world when the Constitution was 
adopted, is the world that should govern us today. We live in a vastly different world, obviously, 
than in 1787 or in 1791, or 1867.”). 
 206. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 422 (1985) (“That I am 
unsure whether rafts and floating motorized automobiles are ‘boats’ does not dispel my 
confidence that rowboats and dories most clearly are boats, and that steam locomotives, 
hamburgers, and elephants equally clearly are not.”). 
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Constitution.  Structural analysis requires judges to engage in a more 
holistic reading of the Constitution and to situate their interpretations 
of individual passages within more macro-level analyses of the entire 
document.  Analysis of some constitutional provisions can be more 
precisely understood when interpreted in light of, or in conjunction 
with, the rest of the Constitution’s language. 
Structural analysis is a four-corners approach that looks for 
meaning from within the document and not from extrinsic sources. It 
should be differentiated, however, from the kind of structuralism 
described by some constitutional scholars, which focuses on the 
broader systems established by the Constitution and the relationships 
it creates between the branches and between the federal and state 
governments.207  The structural analysis applied here is more focused 
on the organization and composition of the document, and what it 
says about the role of government vis-à-vis the individual and about 
the Constitution’s animating values and principles.  It is more akin, 
then, to what Philip Bobbitt describes as ethical analysis.208  Bobbitt 
argues, much like Justice Black,209 that the Constitution provides a 
template for a political system based on maximum freedom, 
autonomy, and limited government.210  The Constitution’s text and 
design provide a “constitutional motif” that should be applied when 
analyzing claims of both new and old rights.211  Bobbitt argues that the 
“constitutional grammar” has already been provided “so that once 
heard we can supply the rest on our own,” which includes recognizing 
new rights not explicitly stated in the text.212 
The claim of a constitutional right of privacy, for example, can be 
recognized not merely because it provides protections that some 
believe desirable, but because the right can be logically inferred from 
the existing cadence of rights.213  Recognizing additional rights from 
time to time, when consistent with the original constitutional 
structure, is not only warranted but was anticipated by the Founders.  
 
 207. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 74–92 (1982). 
 208. Id. 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 187–188. 
 210. BOBBITT, supra note 207, at 101. 
 211. Id. at 177. 
 212. Id. 
 213. For Bobbitt, a case like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), requires no 
sleight-of-hand.  Quite simply, the use of birth control is not the business of the state, and to 
regulate it would upset the “ethos of limited government” that the whole Constitution 
enshrines. 
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James Madison was one of many Framers reluctant to enumerate 
rights in the Constitution for fear that future generations would 
assume the list was exhaustive.214  Bobbitt argues that “to some extent 
the fears of Madison and others . . . have been fulfilled.  Insofar as we 
treat the Bill of Rights as the sole source . . . of constitutional rights, 
we are contributing to the realization of the Framers’ misgivings.”215 
Another obvious structural feature of the Constitution is its 
emphasis on equality.  This emphasis is reflected explicitly in the 
Preamble and in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause, as well as in the Privilege and Immunities Clauses of both the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.216  Equality is also reflected 
implicitly by the absence of provisions that elevate one group’s 
protections over another’s217 and by the universal language used in 
elucidating the rights in the first eight amendments.  This emphasis on 
equality provides courts with useful guidance in assessing the 
constitutionality of government acts that discriminate against 
particular groups.  For example, the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause does not contain an equal protection statement akin to the 
one found in the Fourteenth Amendment.218  Theoretically, then, the 
Constitution does not explicitly limit discriminatory acts by the 
federal government.  But the ethos of equality suggests that there is 
an implicit limitation on all discrimination.  The Supreme Court has 
applied this principle in several cases, including Bolling v. Sharpe, in 
which it struck down public school segregation in the District of 
Columbia, noting that “the concepts of equal protection and due 
process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not 
mutually exclusive.”219  The Court’s analysis in Bolling was at least 
partly structural in that it made some reasonable deductions from the 
 
 214. See Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 
(1988).  Madison ultimately relented, but he later introduced into Congress what would become 
the Ninth Amendment.  Id. at 1–2. 
 215. BOBBITT, supra note 207, at 176. 
 216. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (“We hold these Truths to be self 
evident, that all Men are created equal.”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 217. The obvious exception, however, is the Constitution’s tacit recognition of the 
institution of slavery.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cls. 2–3. 
 218. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 219. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (emphasis added).  The Court held that due process includes 
an implicit guarantee of equal protection.  Id. at 499–500. 
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Constitution’s text without leaning on extrinsic sources.220  Structural 
characteristics, particularly those of autonomy and equality, are 
especially useful in charting the dimensions of the First Amendment 
and the right to gather news. 
D. Analysis of Context 
Whether it is true that the text, history, and structure of the 
Constitution support recognition of a particular right, no approach to 
constitutional interpretation is tenable without some 
acknowledgement of contemporary conditions and societal evolution.  
This is necessary not only to properly apply rights that have already 
been recognized, but also on rare occasions to recognize new ones.221  
As the Court has noted, some rights cannot be meaningfully applied 
without an accounting of shifting social conditions and new 
technology.222  The Court must extrapolate from time to time in order 
to sustain the Constitution’s relevance to successive generations.  As 
Ronald Dworkin puts it, the Framers have merely enunciated a series 
of concepts to which individuals must apply their own conceptions.223 
In applying the sequential approach to interpreting the First 
Amendment, then, a right might still be cognizable—even if it is not 
explicitly protected by the text, nor implicitly protected by references 
to the Framers’ intent or the Constitution’s broader ethos—provided 
it is either (1) indispensable to the exercise of other clearly protected 
rights, or (2) so culturally embedded that refusing recognition would 
subvert a widely recognized dimension of liberty.224  The Supreme 
 
 220. The Court essentially concluded that equal protection is merely a more specific 
expression of due process, which is merely one dimension of liberty.  Id. at 499.  So, although 
the Court resolved this as a Fifth Amendment due process case, its decision may have been 
made easier by the existence of the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 221. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (recognizing a 
constitutional right to privacy). 
 222. Because print media were the only ones known to the Framers, a strict historicist 
interpretation of the First Amendment would preclude protections for communication via 
broadcast, cable, internet and wireless media, among others.  The Supreme Court has never 
taken this view and has extended constitutional protection to various media, focusing primarily 
on their communicative function, rather than on the means by which they accomplish it.  See, 
e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) (“Cable television provides to its subscribers 
news, information, and entertainment.  It is engaged in ‘speech’ under the First Amendment, 
and is, in much of its operation, part of the ‘press.’”). 
 223. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1988). 
 224. The Ninth Amendment provides one constitutional hook for recognition of these types 
of rights.  U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).  In most cases, the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which respectively protect people 
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Court has endorsed the former idea in a number of cases, most 
notably Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.225  The latter idea is more 
nebulous, and interpretivists would no doubt deride it as a usurpation 
of congressional prerogatives or an invitation for judicial 
embellishments.  The risk of overreaching here is certainly real, but to 
foreclose recognition of non-enumerated rights would betray the 
intent of those who drafted and ratified the Ninth Amendment.226 
Identifying what constitutes a culturally embedded right is an 
unavoidably hazardous exercise, but one that the courts have engaged 
in many times.  The courts have recognized the right of criminal 
defendants to be presumed innocent, for example, even though the 
Constitution does not mention it.227  The Supreme Court has 
recognized a constitutional right to travel, both as a necessary pre-
condition for the enjoyment of certain privileges228 and as an essential 
component of individual freedom.229  And certainly all courts would 
have been justified in recognizing a constitutional right for African-
Americans and women to vote, even before ratification of the 
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.  These are the kinds of 
 
against deprivations of their liberty by federal and state governments, are better sources.  See 
U.S. CONST. amends. V, IV. 
 225. 448 U.S. 555, 579–80 (1980) (“But arguments such as the State makes have not 
precluded recognition of important rights not enumerated. Notwithstanding the appropriate 
caution against reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court has 
acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guarantees. For 
example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be presumed innocent, and the 
right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, as well 
as the right to travel, appear nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these important 
but unarticulated rights have nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in 
common with explicit guarantees. The concerns expressed by Madison and others have thus 
been resolved; fundamental rights, even though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized 
by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined.”). 
 226. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 227. The Fifth Amendment requires indictment by grand jury for capital crimes, U.S. 
CONST. amend. V, and the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to a speedy and public 
trial, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, but neither makes clear whether guilt or innocence is to be 
presumed nor what evidentiary standard must be applied.  Nevertheless, the Court has held that 
“[t]he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic 
component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.”  Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 
501, 503 (1976). 
 228. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969) (striking down state law 
imposing one-year residency requirement for receipt of welfare benefits). 
 229. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125–26 (1958) (“The right to travel is a part of the 
‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth 
Amendment . . . . Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers 
as well, was a part of our heritage.  Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be . . . as 
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.”). 
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judgments courts must make, at least where the underlying activity 
involves matters of profound societal expectation that are, as the 
Supreme Court put it, “basic in our scheme of values.”230 
III.  SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS AND THE RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS 
This section applies the elements of the sequential analysis 
described in Part II to the Speech and Press Clauses of the First 
Amendment to consider what each suggests about the existence and 
dimensions of newsgathering rights.  In identifying the core principles 
underlying the First Amendment, this section pays special attention to 
the key questions raised earlier regarding affirmative rights, special 
rights and the definition of “journalist” and “the press.”231 
A. Newsgathering and Text 
Because the rights outlined in the First Amendment are so 
concisely stated and the language so encompassing, it is impossible to 
define the limits of freedom of the press by reference to the text 
alone.  But all constitutional analysis must begin with the text,232 and 
in the case of the First Amendment, the text provides some insights.  
The First Amendment reads “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”233  It does not 
read “speech and press,” as if to suggest a single concept, or even 
“speech or press.”  It says “of speech, or of the press,” which is a more 
starkly disjunctive wording and suggests, however subtly, a calculated 
separation.  The use of the word “the” before “press” could even be 
significant.  By referring to “the press,” perhaps the Framers were 
referring to a distinct institution.  This interpretation would lend 
support to Justice Stewart’s proposition that the Framers intended the 
 
 230. Id. at 126. 
 231. See supra Part I. 
 232. See Schauer, supra note 206, at 431 (“An interpretation is legitimate (which is not the 
same as correct) only insofar as it purports to interpret some language of the document, and 
only insofar as the interpretation is within the boundaries at least suggested by that language.”).  
The Supreme Court has made some references to this idea in the constitutional context, see, 
e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 260 (“It is useful to begin with the text of 
Article III.”), and it is an interpretive canon in the statutory context, see, e.g., Limtiaco v. 
Camacho, 127 S. Ct. 1413, 1418 (2007) (“As always, we begin with the text of the statute.”). 
 233. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
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press to have a unique constitutional status and that the Press Clause 
should be interpreted apart from the Speech Clause.234 
There is some support for that view.  At the time the Bill of Rights 
was ratified, nine states had already provided state constitutional 
protection for press freedom while only one did the same for 
speech.235  Does this indicate a desire by the states to provide unique 
protection for the press?  The 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights 
refers to the press as “the greatest bulwark of liberty,”236 and the 1780 
Massachusetts Constitution states that “liberty of the press is essential 
to the security of the state.”237  These phrases imply that the press 
serves some instrumental purpose—checking government and 
thereby preserving other freedoms—and perhaps that it should be 
protected because of those functions.  James Madison used similar 
language in his initial draft of the First Amendment: “The people shall 
not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to 
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the 
great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”238  This phrasing suggests 
even more concretely that an individual right of expression exists 
apart from the liberty of the press.  Furthermore, the press has a 
specific role to play—to serve as a bulwark of liberty, presumably by 
acting as a government watchdog.  The rights of “the people” are 
presented as natural rights, while the rights of the press are more 
instrumental.  The separation between the two is emphasized by 
Madison’s use of a semicolon. 
It is clear that those who drafted these constitutions viewed the 
press as serving a special role, but that does not necessarily mean they 
had in mind a special set of protections for printers or publishers.  It is 
possible that they anticipated that anyone could serve a press 
function—at least anyone with access to a printing press.  The 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which protected both speech and 
press, reads: “‘That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and 
of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of 
 
 234. Stewart, supra note 38, at 631. 
 235. Anderson, supra note 38, at 464–65. 
 236. Id. at 464.  This language is borrowed from Cato’s Letters.  Id. at 463 (citing LEONARD 
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN 
HISTORY 68–69 (1960)).  Similar language was used in the 1776 North Carolina Declaration of 
Rights.  Id. at 463–64. 
 237. Id. at 465.  Similar language was used in the 1783 New Hampshire Bill of Rights.  Id. 
 238. Id. at 478 (quoting 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 690 (1789)). 
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the press ought not to be restrained.’”239  Here the emphasis is not so 
much on the instrumental role of the press, but on the natural right of 
all people to express themselves freely in any medium.  Rights of 
expression, whether through speech or printed words, reside with the 
individual and should be protected for reasons other than their social 
benefits.  On this view, freedom of the press is simply an extension of 
freedom of speech.  It is not so much a distinct institution as it is 
simply a unique medium through which ideas can be delivered to an 
audience. 
Historian Leonard Levy argues that the common understanding at 
the time of ratification was that freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press were thought of interchangeably.240  The fact that nine states 
had protections for a free press supports Levy’s thesis, according to 
Melville Nimmer, because it would be senseless to protect freedom of 
the press and not freedom of speech.241  That the First Amendment 
contains references to both speech and press does not necessarily 
imply a two-tiered set of rights, at least according to Levy and 
Nimmer.242  Perhaps the emphasis on the press was simply to 
recognize that the press was the principal venue for government 
criticism; it had undeniable social and political power, and the press—
not unmediated speech—had been the primary target of punishment 
during the preceding century.  Because many of the Framers were also 
regular contributors to publications,243 they might have simply been 
declaring that the right to free expression reached both the 
contributor and the publisher. 
After John Adams was selected to draft the Massachusetts 
Constitution, he included provisions protecting “freedom of speaking” 
and “liberty of the press.”244  This language parallels the First 
Amendment, and it too can be interpreted several ways.  On one 
hand, the separation of these two phrases suggests that they may not 
be interchangeable.  On the other hand, it is unclear whether Adams 
had in mind a separate set of constitutional protections for the press 
as an institution. 
 
 239. Id. at 465 (quoting I.B. SCHWARTZ, 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 266 (1971)). 
 240. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 183–85 (1985). 
 241. See Nimmer, supra note 38, at 639–41. 
 242. See id.; LEVY, supra note 240, at 183–85. 
 243. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 309–315. 
 244. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 221 (2001). 
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The text of the First Amendment does not yield definitive 
answers, even when looking to parallel provisions in state 
constitutions.  What is certain is that the Framers intended to protect 
the freedom of all citizens to publicly express ideas regardless of 
medium.  Most of the evidence also suggests that the Framers 
recognized that the press played a unique role in society.245  It served 
as a “bulwark of liberty” that provided a check on those in power.  
Several questions remain, however.  First, does the press serve the 
bulwark-of-liberty function merely by providing a vehicle for political 
dialogue and criticism of government, or did the Framers anticipate a 
more active press role?  Second, even though the Framers clearly 
recognized a unique role for the press, did they intend to endow the 
institution or its practitioners with a special set of rights?  Third, 
whom did the Framers see as the press?  As another provision of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution reads: “The printing presses shall be free to 
every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the 
legislature, or any part of the government.”246  In this example, the 
press seems almost incidental—it is not an institution; it has no 
character, identity, or spirit.  It is merely a useful technology, 
employable by “every person” who seeks to act as a bulwark of 
liberty. 
Although revealing in some ways, the text of the First Amendment 
is sufficiently ambiguous that its meaning cannot be deduced without 
paying attention to the next step in the sequence: intent.  As David 
Anderson explains, “[T]ext and meaning ultimately are inseparable; to 
understand what the Framers said, we inevitably seek to understand 
what they meant.”247 
B. Newsgathering and Intent 
Although freedom of the press is a central feature of American 
democracy, the Supreme Court did not decide a case involving the 
press until 1931—almost a century and a half after the First 
Amendment was ratified.248  The Press Clause laid dormant for 140 
 
 245. Indeed, most state constitutions prior to the ratification of the Constitution contained 
provisions protecting freedom of the press.  See Anderson, supra note 38, at 464–66. 
 246. PA. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 247. Anderson, supra note 38, at 462. 
 248. One reason for this was that the Supreme Court had held in earlier decisions that the 
Bill of Rights did not apply against state governments.  See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 
460 (1907); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (1 How.) 410, 434 (1847); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (1 Pet.) 
540, 582 (1840). 
04__UGLAND_FINAL.DOC 7/23/2008  9:34:02 AM 
2008] DEMARCATING THE RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS 159 
years before the Supreme Court, in Near v. Minnesota, struck down an 
injunction against a muckraking newspaper publisher.249  In so doing, 
the Court breathed life into the Press Clause250 and affirmed the 
principle that prior restraints on the press are presumptively 
unconstitutional.251  In addition, Near was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court held that state governments have no more discretion 
than the federal government to restrict citizens’ freedom of speech or 
press.252 
To many, including scholar Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Near was merely 
the first step in a long process of charting the boundaries of press 
freedom.253  But to others, Near was both the beginning and the end of 
free-press jurisprudence.254  These individuals pointed to the work of 
historian Leonard W. Levy, which sought to debunk the “received 
hypothesis” that the First Amendment was designed to provide 
sweeping protection against restraints on expression, including 
subsequent punishments.255 
Levy made four key points in his work, Legacy of Suppression.  
First, the libertarian philosophy of press freedom that had been 
advanced by Chafee, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice Louis 
Brandeis, Justice Hugo Black, and others did not reflect the view of 
 
 249. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931). 
 250. Although some previous cases dealt with material that was printed, see, e.g., Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (pamphlets); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) 
(mailed documents)—Near was the first case involving a traditional mass medium.  It was also 
the first in which the Court addressed the meaning of the Press Clause, and the first in which the 
Court struck down as unconstitutional a government action restricting the press. 
 251. The Court conceded that there might be rare situations in which a prior restraint would 
be constitutional.  Restrictions of obscene speech, speech that incites violence or speech that 
poses an immediate threat to national security might justify the use of a prior restraint.  Near, 
283 U.S. at 716. 
 252. Id. at 707.  This was the first manifestation of the “incorporation doctrine.”  The Court 
held that because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from restricting “life, liberty and 
property,” and because freedom of speech and press are among people’s core liberties, the 
states have no more latitude to restrict those rights than does the federal government. 
 253. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 381 (1948). Chafee 
argued that freedom of the press meant much more than freedom from prior restraints.  He 
attacked laws aimed at sedition and others that he thought contradicted the broad aims of the 
First Amendment. 
 254. Indeed, the Court reinforced this view in Near by noting that there was nothing to 
prevent aggrieved readers from bringing a suit for libel against Jay Near or others like him.  
Near, 283 U.S. at 628. 
 255. LEVY, supra note 236, at 309. 
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those who framed and ratified the First Amendment.256  Levy argued 
that a libertarian view of press freedom did not emerge until the early 
1800s in the wake of prosecutions under the Sedition Act of 1798.257  
Second, the Framers did not intend to eliminate the law of seditious 
libel or the traditional conception of press freedom as defined by Sir 
William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England.258  
Blackstone wrote: “‘The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the 
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints 
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal 
matter when published.’”259  Levy argues that the First Amendment 
was designed to be nothing more than a codification of this 
principle.260  Third, although prosecutions for seditious libel prior to 
the revolution were rare, colonial legislatures punished speech more 
repressively and more frequently than previous scholars had 
acknowledged.261  Finally, according to Levy, the First Amendment was 
not penned to satisfy a deeply felt public concern for freedom of the 
press but was, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, merely “a lucky 
political accident.”262 
Levy’s alternative thesis of the First Amendment provoked 
widespread criticism.263  Some of it was not aimed at the strength of 
his scholarship, but at its practical consequences for the cause of press 
freedom.264  Indeed, the “received hypothesis,” whether credible or 
 
 256. Id. at 214–15 (“Freedom of the press was everywhere a grand topic for declamation, 
but the insistent demand for its protection on parchment was not accompanied by a reasoned 
analysis of what it meant . . . .”). 
 257. Id. at 258 (citing Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired)). 
 258. LEVY, supra note 240, at 245–48. 
 259. See id. at 12 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 151–52 (emphasis added)). 
 260. LEVY, supra note 240, at 309 (criticizing the early advocates of the libertarian view of 
falling victim to the “Anglo-American habit of going forward while facing backwards: rights that 
should exist are established on the fictitious pretense that they have ever existed”). 
 261. Levy argued that, because many of the same legislators who were meting out 
punishments against colonial publishers were the same ones who debated and ratified the Bill of 
Rights, we should not assume that their conceptions of press freedom were any more expansive 
than the Blackstonian position.   Id. at vii–viii. 
 262. LEVY, supra note 240, at xii  Levy argues that the absence of a Bill of Rights was first 
trumpeted by the Anti-federalists who used it as a smokescreen to undermine support for the 
new Constitution.  After it was passed, it was used by the Federalists to pander to public opinion 
and allay fears about excessive federal power. 
 263. See, e.g., James Morton Smith, Legacy of Suppression, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 156 (1963) 
(book review). 
 264. Levy says his work “appalled some liberals” and that his critics feared that his work 
would be used as a justification for rescinding many of the protections the courts and 
legislatures had conferred on the press in the preceding decades.  LEVY, supra note 240, at xvii.  
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not, was working just fine as a foundation for favorable court 
rulings.265  But the critique of Levy’s work was more substantial than 
the mere sour-grapes protests of press advocates.  Levy himself 
retreated from some of his key propositions, writing a revised version 
of Legacy twenty-three years later, titled Emergence of a Free Press.266  
In this follow-up, Levy stood by many of his earlier conclusions but 
admitted he was wrong to contend that the “American experience 
with freedom of political expression was as slight as the conceptual 
and legal understanding was narrow.”267  Levy was so focused on the 
law of the press—which, among other things, permitted prosecutions 
for sedition—that he underappreciated the actual practices of the 
press, which he said “operated as if the law of seditious libel did not 
exist.”268  The press “scorchingly” and “contemptuously” ridiculed 
public officials, he said, and routinely filled their papers with calumny 
and rumor.269  Jeffrey Smith remarked that,  “No governmental 
institution, political faction, or individual was free from attacks such 
as few newspapers today would dare to print.”270  The brazen, 
outrageous, and fiercely partisan press of the time was in practice as 
free as it had ever been, and perhaps as free as it ever would be.271 
 
He also notes that Justice Hugo Black, whom Levy says was “innocent of history when he did 
not distort it or invent it” wrote in a letter to a friend that Legacy was “probably one of the most 
devastating blows that has been delivered against civil liberty in America for a long time.”  Id. at 
xviii. 
 265. Between the Court’s 1931 ruling in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) and the 1960 
publication of Legacy of Suppression, the libertarian view of the First Amendment had begun 
its ascendancy and it was beginning to find expression in the opinions of the Court.  See, e.g., 
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (extending First Amendment protection to motion 
pictures); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (narrowing the “fighting words” exception 
to the First Amendment); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking 
down a flag-salute statute as a violation of the First Amendment); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 
297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down a tax law that imposed special burdens on the press).  All of 
these were precursors to the most important catalyst for libertarian press theory. N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring public officials suing for libel to prove the 
defendant acted with actual malice and rejecting the legitimacy of seditious libel). 
 266. LEVY, supra note 240, at x–xi. 
 267. Id. at x. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. JEFFREY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM 5 (1988) (quoting Merrill Jenson, 
Legacy of Suppression, 75 HARV. L. REV. 456, 457 (1961) (book review)). 
 271. We might like to think the press today operates with greater freedom than it did two 
centuries ago, but when one considers the burdens imposed on the modern media by civil suits 
for libel, privacy, and other torts, as well as the regular issuances of subpoenas, a case could be 
made that the media today are less free—or at least they behave less freely—than the press of 
the Revolutionary period. 
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It is true, however, that during the Revolutionary period the Tory 
or loyalist presses were regularly attacked (verbally and physically), 
which led Levy to ask “whether there was free speech during the 
Revolutionary era if only the speech of freedom was free.”272  But this 
statement should only temper and not obscure the undeniable fact 
that the press of the Revolutionary period was “uninhibited, robust 
and wide-open.”273  And it is implausible that the Framers’ vision of 
the future included a press with less freedom than the press they 
knew.  The notion that the Framers viewed the First Amendment 
exclusively as a barrier against the imposition of prior restraints is 
specious, because prior restraints had all but vanished in the colonies 
after the end of press licensing in the 1720s.274  Why would the 
principal concern of the Framers have been the protection of a right 
that had not been restricted for more than seventy years?275 
It is also false, or at least an overstatement, to suggest as Levy did 
that no libertarian press ideology had evolved by the time of the First 
Amendment’s ratification, as it had in England, and that the Framers 
therefore did not have a well-conceived notion of the meaning of 
freedom of the press. Levy observed that there were only two 
significant sources of libertarian press ideology during the colonial 
and Revolutionary periods.  The first was the argument of lawyer 
Andrew Hamilton in his defense of Printer John Peter Zenger, who 
had been charged with seditious libel in 1735.276  Zenger was acquitted 
by a jury that audaciously defied the judge’s explicit instructions.277  
The second was the widespread publication of John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon’s essay “On Freedom of Speech”—one of the essays 
 
 272. LEVY, supra note 240, at xii. 
 273. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  This phrase comes from Justice 
Brennan’s opinion for the court in which, in dicta, he rejected the constitutionality of the 
Sedition Act, saying, “Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon 
its validity has carried the day in the court of history.”  Id. at 276 (internal citations omitted). 
 274. See LEVY, supra note 240, at 36–37, 49. 
 275. Levy later conceded this point, noting that “freedom of the press merely began with its 
immunity from previous restraints.”  LEVY, supra note 240, at xi (emphasis added). 
 276. See LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 43–
62 (1966).  For a more comprehensive account of the case, see VINCENT BURANELLI, THE 
TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (1957). 
 277. See Nathan Seth Chapman, Note, Punishment by the People: Rethinking the Jury’s 
Political Role in Assigning Punitive Damages, 56 DUKE L.J. 1119, 1128 (2007) (noting that 
despite the judge’s instruction to only consider the factual question of whether or not Zenger 
published the allegedly libelous material, and to not consider its legality, the jury acquitted 
Zenger in what was an historic act of jury nullification). 
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collectively known as Cato’s Letters.278  The absence of other examples 
led Levy to conclude that freedom of expression must not have been 
a serious concern of the Framers and their contemporaries.279 
But Cato and Zenger had more than momentary significance.  The 
bold actions of the jury in the Zenger trial, as well as Hamilton’s 
arguments in that case, became part of the Revolutionary folklore.280  
Though Zenger’s case did not change the law of libel, it provided a 
catalyzing example of a subversive spirit and helped fortify the press’ 
efforts to monitor colonial overseers.281  Cato’s Letters, a collection of 
radical Whig essays first published in the colonies by Benjamin 
Franklin in 1722, were even more influential.282  Those essays were 
excerpted in hundreds of publications and were quoted ad nauseam 
by patriot leaders.283  Cato’s Letters were part of the ideological 
backbone of the Revolution, and the essay on freedom of speech was 
the most venerated statement of the eighteenth century on the liberty 
of the press.284  Its “bulwark of liberty” language became the printer’s 
mantra and those words were incorporated into several state 
constitutions as well as Madison’s initial draft of the First 
Amendment.285  So, even if few other prominent sources of libertarian 
press ideology existed during this period, they were hardly necessary. 
 
 278. John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same is 
Inseparable from Public Liberty, in 1 CATO’S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND 
RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 86 (1733) (“Freedom of speech is the great 
bulwark of liberty; they prosper and die together.”). 
 279. See LEVY, supra note 240. 
 280. Levy acknowledges that James Alexander’s account of the trial, “A Brief Narrative of 
the Case and Tryal [sic] of John Peter Zenger,” was, “with the possible exception of Cato’s 
Letters, the most widely known source of libertarian thought in England and America during 
the eighteenth century.”  LEVY, supra note 240, at 130. 
 281. See MICHAEL EMERY ET AL., THE PRESS AND AMERICA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 
OF THE MASS MEDIA 40 (2000) (noting that even though the Zenger case did not change the 
law of libel, it enunciated the principle that the people have the right to criticize their governors 
and that it is perhaps no coincidence that there is no record of any seditious libel case in a 
colonial court after 1735). 
 282. Franklin first published the essay On Freedom of Speech after his brother James had 
been imprisoned for publishing something that offended the Massachusetts Legislature.  LEVY, 
supra note 240, at 113, 119. 
 283. SMITH, supra note 270, at 25 (“Cato’s Letters were published and republished for 
decades in Britain and were immensely popular in America, where journalists and political 
theorists praised and imitated the authors.”). 
 284. CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 141 (1953) (“No one can spend any 
time in the newspapers, library inventories, and pamphlets of colonial America without realizing 
that Cato’s Letters rather than Locke’s Civil Government was the most popular, quotable, 
esteemed source of political ideas in the colonial period.”). 
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 229–231. 
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Jeffrey Smith points out that in fact there was a “lucid and 
dynamic” free press ideology at the time of the First Amendment’s 
ratification.286  This ideology developed from a combination of radical 
Whig philosophy emphasizing the connection between public 
knowledge and political freedom, and broader liberal and 
Enlightenment political philosophies, which rejected the divine right 
of kings, emphasized reason over orthodoxy, and put faith in the 
individual as an autonomous political actor.287 
The contention that the Framers had no intention of eliminating 
the law of seditious libel has more support, and it was one of the 
conclusions from Legacy that Levy defended in Emergence.288  It is 
true that the writers of the Revolutionary period, even the most 
libertarian—“Cato,” Tunis Wortman, even Thomas Jefferson—would 
often temper their free-press advocacy with a caveat suggesting some 
limit to the freedom.289  The Pennsylvania Constitution is 
representative in that it protects people’s ability to “freely speak, 
write or print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that 
liberty.”290  But these caveats are merely acknowledgements that 
freedom of the press is not absolute, something nearly every writer, 
judge, scholar, and critic has conceded over the past two centuries.291  
Also, during Senate debate over the language of the First 
Amendment, a motion was made to qualify Madison’s phrasing to 
include a provision saying press freedom should be protected “in as 
ample a manner as hath at any time been secured by the common 
law.”292  This motion’s failure is evidence that the First Amendment 
was not designed merely to codify the common law.293 
 
 286. SMITH, supra note 270, at vii–viii. 
 287. Id. at 42–53. 
 288. LEVY, supra note 240, at xii. 
 289. See 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 98 (ALBERT ELLERY BERGH & 
ANDREW A. LIBSCOMB eds., 1907) (“A declaration that the Federal Government will never 
restrain the presses from printing anything they please will not take away the liability of the 
printers for false facts printed.”). 
 290. PA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added). 
 291. Although some have taken the view that the First Amendment provides an absolute 
shield against government interference with speech, see, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Absolutism: 
Unadorned and Without Apology, 81 GEO. L.J. 351 (1992), few, if any, have suggested that 
“speech” be defined so broadly as to fully immunize every expressive act or utterance, including 
the shouting of “fire” in a crowded theatre, to use Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s familiar 
example.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 292. Anderson, supra note 38, at 480 (quoting JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE 
SENATE 70 (1789)). 
 293. Smith adds that there was widespread opposition to the crime of seditious libel prior to 
the First Amendment’s ratification, and that although most writers agreed that people should 
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Some suggest that the clearest evidence of the Framers’ narrow 
conception of press freedom was the passage of the Sedition Act in 
1798.294  Why would the Federalists, many of whom participated 
directly in the framing, passage, or ratification of the First 
Amendment, be so indifferent to free-press interests in 1798 if they 
had an expansive notion of press freedom in 1791?  The answer is 
simple.  If the Framers all agreed upon one thing, it was that power is 
inevitably abused—particularly where concentrated or unchecked.295  
It is a natural and inescapable human tendency that the 
Constitution—with its focus on limited government, enumerated 
powers, and checks and balances—and the Bill of Rights—with its 
focus on preserving individual autonomy against government 
intrusion—were designed to guard against.  That the Federalists 
sought to usurp these constitutional protections after ratification of 
the Bill of Rights simply confirms what the Framers—both 
Republicans and Federalists—understood and anticipated prior to the 
ratification.  As James Madison opined in Federalist 51, men are not 
angels; if they were, “neither external nor internal controls . . . would 
be necessary,” and indeed, neither would government.296  Thomas 
Jefferson subsequently exonerated all those who were prosecuted 
under the Sedition Act, and Congress later repaid the fines,297 which 
suggests that the law was more likely an anomalous political 
overreach than an expression of broad indifference to First 
Amendment interests. 
In assessing the Framers’ intent, the focus should be on what they 
said and wrote before the Constitution was adopted—before their 
judgments were clouded by politics and practicalities; before they had 
 
have legal recourse to defend their personal reputations, the proper remedy was a civil suit for 
damages.  See Smith, supra note 263, at 74–77. 
 294. See supra note 250.  The Sedition Act made it a crime—punishable by a fine of up to 
$2,000 and a prison sentence of up to two years—to publish any “false, scandalous and malicious 
writing or writings against the government of the United States . . . with intent to defame the 
said government . . . .”  JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS 441–42 (1956).  There 
were fourteen prosecutions under the Act, all targeting the Republican or opposition press and 
ten convictions.  After Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency, he and Congress allowed the 
law to expire, and Jefferson pardoned those in jail and exonerated those awaiting trial.  EMERY 
ET AL., supra note 281, at 72. 
 295. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521, 528 (1977) (noting that the Framers saw the First Amendment as 
essential in “checking the inherent tendency of government officials to abuse the power 
entrusted to them”). 
 296. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 297. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
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emerged from what John Rawls describes as the “original position.”298  
It is in that position, in which the Framers did not know whether they 
would be the wielders or the subjects of the powers they were 
creating, that their natural inclination toward self-aggrandizement 
yielded to more extrinsic interests. 
Although Levy and other critics have provided a healthy antidote 
to the most idealized characterizations of original intent, they 
overstate their case.  It is clear that the Framers believed strongly in 
individual autonomy; they believed the press should play an 
important watchdog role; and they believed the press should be 
uninhibited, robust and wide open, although certainly not completely 
unrestrained or beyond the reach of the law. 
How the Framers felt about the right to gather news is more 
difficult to gauge, because newsgathering practices had not yet 
evolved into the sophisticated set of techniques and standards that are 
familiar today.  If newsgathering was defined broadly as the search for 
and acquisition of newsworthy information for the purpose of 
communicating it to others, then newsgathering is, in fact, as old as 
human civilization.  Even if that definition is too broad, one must 
concede that newsgathering has been conducted in America for as 
long as there have been news media, and certainly well before 
ratification of the First Amendment. 
In 1690, in the first edition of the first newspaper ever published in 
the American colonies, printer Benjamin Harris made a bold 
statement to his readers about his newsgathering practices. Harris 
wrote that his new publication, Publick Occurrences Both Forreign 
and Domestick (“Publick Occurrences”), would not merely serve as a 
vehicle for his personal reflections on the world but would seek to 
apprise people of all newsworthy information, relying on only the best 
sources.299  He promised readers that “[this publisher] will take what 
pains he can to obtain a Faithful Relation of all such things; and will 
particularly make himself beholden to such Persons in Boston whom 
he knows to have been for their own use the diligent Observers of 
such matters.”300  He added later that he would only publish what he 
knew to be true, “repairing to the best fountains for Information.”301  
 
 298. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971). 
 299. JAMES MELVIN LEE, HISTORY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 10 (1923). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
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The royal governor banned Publick Occurrences after its first issue,302 
and it would be fourteen years before the appearance of the next 
colonial paper, Boston’s News-Letter, in 1704.303  John Campbell 
published the News-Letter, relying on the part-time services of several 
correspondents in New York, Newport, Portsmouth, Philadelphia, and 
Salem to supply the paper with much of its news.304  The paper’s 
contents were often prosaic (arrival dates of ships, accidents, court 
actions, storm reports),305 but Campbell did rely on sources, just as 
Harris had promised to do.  In several instances, the paper provided 
detailed coverage of more newsworthy events.306  In at least a limited 
sense, then, Harris and Campbell, the colonies’ first newspaper 
publishers, were also its first newsgatherers. 
Colonial printers and publishers relied on sources in a manner 
similar to how modern reporters do, although perhaps less formally 
and less frequently.  In addition to at least occasionally consulting 
with sources, most colonial papers had relationships with contributors 
who wrote essays pseudonymously.  This was a common practice in 
the early papers and continued throughout the eighteenth and much 
of the nineteenth centuries.307  The most famous political tracts of the 
colonial period, the radical Whig essays of Gordon and Trenchard, 
were published under the pseudonym “Cato.”308  During the 
Revolutionary period, anonymous essays abounded in the press.309  
Thomas Paine’s famous tract attacking slavery was published in the 
Philadelphia Journal under the name “Humanus.”310  Paine’s Common 
Sense was also published pseudonymously, and in fact was later 
attacked by College of Philadelphia Provost William Smith under the 
 
 302. Id. at 9. 
 303. Id. at 17, 19. 
 304. FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM 50 (1962).  Note, however, that these 
were not correspondents in the contemporary sense.  They were not paid or identified in print, 
and their reports were sporadic.  They were primarily postmasters from other cities.  Other 
early papers also relied on correspondents, including the Boston Gazette and the Pennsylvania 
Gazette.  Id. 
 305. LEE, supra note 299, at 12. 
 306. Campbell, for example, provided detailed, first-hand accounts of the hanging of six 
pirates in 1704, which were published in a special edition of the paper.  Id. at 24. 
 307. See HAZEL DICKEN-GARCIA, JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 67 (1989) (noting that reporters rarely identified their sources, “even as late as the 
1890s”). 
 308. See supra text accompanying note 278. 
 309. See generally LEVY, supra note 240 (discussing several authors who submitted writings 
using a pseudonym). 
 310. See MOTT, supra note 304, at 91 & n.36. 
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name “Cato.”311  Paine rebutted Smith in the Pennsylvania Packet as 
“The Forester.”312  John Adams, John Dickenson, and Samuel Adams 
all published anonymous essays that were instrumental in the 
Revolutionary campaign.313  Even the great essays of Madison, 
Hamilton, and Jay, which urged ratification of the newly minted 
Constitution and ultimately became known as the Federalist Papers, 
were first published in the New York Independent Journal, and later 
scores of other papers, under the pseudonym “Publius.”314  These 
essays provide a handful of examples of a practice that was a defining 
feature of American journalism and one that remains so today.315 
Printers’ relationships with anonymous contributors were similar 
to today’s confidential reporter–source relationships in that the 
printers usually understood that the contributors’ identities were to 
be kept confidential, though in many cases the identities of the 
anonymous authors were widely known or could be deduced from 
their writings.316  But in some instances in which the author’s identity 
was unknown, the targets of printed criticisms sought to discover the 
author’s identity.317  Importantly, many of those demands were 
challenged or ignored.318  In 1765, during the controversy over the 
Stamp Act, a person or group signing as “Freedom” submitted a letter 
to the clerk of the House in New York that accused its members of 
not supporting “public Liberty.”319  The Assembly then requested that 
the governor offer a reward of fifty pounds to anyone who would 
reveal the identities of the authors of the “Libellous, Scandalous, and 
 
 311. Id. at 91. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 89. 
 314. Clinton Rossiter, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at viii (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
 315. Most contemporary publications include bylines on works submitted by others (letters 
to the editor, columns, Op/Ed pieces), which is unlike the practice in the Revolutionary era.  
But the news is still replete with information and quotations from unidentified sources, and 
much of the material on blogs is published anonymously or without precise attribution. 
 316. See LEVY, supra note 240, at 206 (citing ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1776–1790 (1942)). 
 317. See id. at 62–83. 
 318. Dwight L. Teeter, for example, notes that “[t]he pennames of the men who wrote for 
the newspapers concealed some of Pennsylvania’s—and America’s—most renowned 
politicians” and that “[p]olitical power helped to shield the printers from punishment.”  Dwight 
L. Teeter, Press Freedom and the Public Printing: Pennsylvania 1775–83, 45 JOURNALISM Q. 
445, 448–49 (1968). 
 319. See LEVY, supra note 240, at 64. 
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Seditious” letter.320  This was a substantial reward, but no one 
responded.321 
In 1769, after the Governor offered a 150-pound reward for the 
identity of the author of two handbills that attacked the New York 
Assembly, a journeyman printer in the shop that produced the 
handbills came forward to claim the money and identified the 
printer’s owner, James Parker, as publisher of the handbills.322  Parker 
was questioned, and though he initially balked at having to identify 
the handbills’ author, he ultimately relented after interrogation and 
threats of imprisonment and the loss of his job as comptroller of the 
post office.323  Parker identified the author as Alexander McDougall, 
who was subsequently tried for seditious libel.324 
Even more revealing are the actions of New-Jersey Gazette editor 
Isaac Collins, who published an anonymous essay in 1779 satirizing 
Governor William Livingston.325  The governor’s Council demanded 
that Collins reveal the author’s name, but he refused.326  As Leonard 
Levy explains, Collins then wrote a letter to the Council explaining his 
decision and pointing out that “if he gave up the name of the author 
without his permission, he would not only be betraying a trust; he 
would ‘be far from acting as a faithful guardian of the press.’”327  The 
Council voted seventeen-to-eleven against taking further action 
against Collins.328  Five years later, Livingston himself wrote an 
anonymous essay in the Gazette under the name “Scipio,” and after 
Collins was again pressured to reveal the author’s identity, Livingston, 
using the same penname, responded with a series of articles defending 
anonymous writings and their importance to press freedom.329 
These few anecdotes do not provide conclusive evidence of a 
pervasive appreciation for newsgathering or the sanctity of reporter–
source relationships.  But they do help dispel the notion that prior to 
the First Amendment, printers had no such conceptions.  Scholars like 
Don Pember are probably correct when they say “[n]ews-gathering, 
 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 76. 
 323. Id. at 76–77. 
 324. Id. at 77. 
 325. Id. at 189. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 189–90. 
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reporting, access to government information as we speak of it today 
was not really an important part of the American press of that era.”330  
But it is just as misleading to suggest that printers during this period 
did not gather news, did not have relationships with sources, and did 
not appreciate source confidentiality. 
With respect to history and the Framers’ intent, a few points seem 
clear.  First, the Framers and their contemporaries understood that 
the press plays a vital role in checking government abuses and in 
providing a forum for individual expression.331  There is no evidence, 
however, that they saw the press—that is, the institutional class of 
printers—as requiring special rights that other individuals or groups 
did not possess.  It was not the unique skill, identity, or character of 
printers that the Framers sought to protect; it was the function they 
served and the vehicle they provided for individuals’ expression that 
warranted protection.  This view augers for the kind of egalitarian 
conception of the press described earlier—one that emphasizes 
conduct over credentials and that encompasses bloggers and others 
whose practices parallel those of the printers and pamphleteers of the 
Revolutionary era. 332  Second, printers during this period did engage 
in newsgathering activity and did consult with sources.333  Moreover, 
they respected the special nature of their relationship with sources 
and in some instances refused to divulge the names of their 
anonymous contributors in the face of considerable government 
pressure.334  Protections like the reporter’s privilege, then, have a 
substantial historical foundation that should not be overlooked.  
Third, the Framers almost certainly did not anticipate the First 
Amendment being used as a vehicle for access to government records 
or proceedings.  Other than the criminal courts, which had been open 
to the public for centuries in both the colonies and England, the 
Framers’ experience with open government was almost non-existent, 
and there is certainly no evidence that they viewed access as a 
constitutional requirement.335  The arguments to the contrary are 
 
 330. Don R. Pember, Founders (Meeting in Secret) Protected Our Right to Publish, but Not 
to Gather the News, BULL. AM. SOC’Y NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Dec. 1978–Jan. 1979, at 6. 
 331. See generally Blasi, supra note 295. 
 332. See supra Part I.B. 
 333. See supra text accompanying notes 299–315. 
 334. See supra text accompanying notes 316–329. 
 335. Neither the proceedings of the Continental Congress nor the Constitutional 
Convention were open to the public, the U.S. Senate did not open its doors until 1794, and 
according to historian Harold Nelson, the colonial legislatures only admitted the public when 
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usually built around a set of indefinite statements from Madison and 
others336 that, although clearly supporting access as a kind of civic 
virtue, did not suggest that it is constitutionally mandated.337 
All of these conclusions are based on an analysis of text and 
intent.  But further clarity can be sought by reading the First 
Amendment and interpreting the historical record in light of the 
Constitution’s broader structure and rhetorical framing. 
C. Newsgathering and Structure 
In applying the sequential approach to the First Amendment, it is 
necessary to step back from these sources and consider whether the 
rights sought flow naturally from the general tenor of the 
Constitution.  Rights not explicitly stated in the Constitution may 
nevertheless be recognized where they are consistent with the 
constitutional grammar that shapes the entire document. In this 
context, the question is whether a right to gather news is compatible 
with the framework of rights outlined in the Constitution. 
In assessing the meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses of the 
First Amendment, several structural characteristics of the broader 
document must be considered.  One is that the Constitution was 
plainly composed to preserve negative freedom—that is, freedom 
from government.338  The Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not 
 
“the revolutionaries could make propaganda out of [it].”  Harold L. Nelson, Separating the 
Inseparable? Linking News-Gathering with Publishing Called “Dubious,” BULL. AM. SOC’Y 
NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Dec. 1978–Jan. 1979, at 7. 
 336. See, e.g., Dyk, supra note 38, at 959 (suggesting that the Framers recognized the 
importance of access).  Dyk quotes Cato’s essay on “Freedom of Speech,” which states, “[I]t is 
in the Interest, and ought to be the Ambition, of all honest magistrates, to have their Deeds 
openly examined, and publickly [sic] screened . . . .”  Id.  He also quotes James Madison, who 
wrote that to “‘freely examine public characters and measures, and of free communication 
thereon’ was ‘the only effectual guardian of every other right.’”  Id.  Both of these statements 
can be read, however, as seeking only a right to openly criticize and hold accountable through 
expression, not as a right of access to monitor officials’ daily activities. 
 337. Nelson, supra note 335, at 7. 
 338. The main body of the Constitution, for example, carefully delimits the powers of the 
various branches and only allows government officials to exercise the authority specifically 
granted to them.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (identifying the so-called enumerated powers 
of Congress).  In addition, the Bill of Rights provisions are presented as a list of prohibitions—
things the government may not do—as opposed to a list of actions it must take or obligations it 
must fulfill on behalf of the people.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no 
law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not 
be infringed.”); U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No soldier shall . . . be quartered in any house . . . .”); 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to 
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compel the government to guarantee specific things to individuals 
(e.g., property, health care, employment, education) nor to protect 
private parties from each other.339  The founding documents identify 
the government’s powers, with an emphasis on the limits of those 
powers, and impose a set of restraints on government authority to 
intrude into the lives of sovereign people.  None of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights can be properly characterized as affirmative, 
particularly the First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law”).340  
Thus, in interpreting the First Amendment, the arguments for rights of 
access to government records or proceedings are invariably strained, 
in part because they require the application of an interpretive 
template that recasts the First Amendment in ways that are 
inconsistent with both the language of the Amendment and the 
language used throughout the Constitution.  The Constitution’s 
negative construction suggests only that the government must not 
interfere with individuals’ expressive freedom, not that it must 
affirmatively assist their acquisition of knowledge or facilitate access 
to communications media.341  And proposals for rights of access to the 
media, even if they find support from some theory of free expression, 
would require an abandonment of this key structural characteristic of 
the Constitution.342  Legitimate bases remain upon which to recognize 
constitutional rights of access,343 but they find no support from a 
structural analysis of the Constitution. 
Another structural characteristic of the Constitution is that it is 
fundamentally an expression of support for individual autonomy.  
Clearly, the First Amendment prohibits most direct restraints on 
individual expression, but the tenor and shape of the Constitution 
also suggest that government actions that interfere with individual or 
institutional autonomy—particularly those which intimidate speakers 
or otherwise inhibit expressive or investigative acts—ought to be 
 
answer . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . nor cruel and 
unusual punishment inflicted.”). 
 339. The Constitution only addresses the powers of the federal government and the 
limitations on those powers. 
 340. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 341. Similarly, the fact that the government is prohibited from forcing a citizen to surrender 
his arms or to quarter troops in his home does not mean it is obligated to supply him with 
weapons and a home in the first place.  Nor does the First Amendment’s prohibition of 
government suppression of religious expression compel the government to facilitate that activity 
by constructing places of worship. 
 342. For more on the negative rights construction, see supra Part I.C. 
 343. See supra text accompanying notes 170–173. 
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sharply scrutinized.344  For this reason, the Court should have treated 
differently the protections sought by the media litigants in Branzburg, 
Zurcher, Herbert, and Cohen.  For example, in Branzburg and other 
reporter’s privilege cases decided by the lower courts, the privilege is 
often framed as little more than a demand by journalists to be 
excused from the normal obligations of citizenship.345  When 
presented that way, the conclusion is simple: Journalists are not above 
the law and are not entitled to any extraordinary protections. 
Yet the reporter’s privilege is really about government 
interference with the private, confidential relationships between 
journalists and their sources.  The privilege should therefore be 
conceived of as a negative right, shielding journalists (defined 
broadly) from government encroachments.  The same analysis should 
be applied in cases involving newsroom searches, inquiries into 
journalist’s editorial processes, and journalists’ decisions about the 
violability of their own agreements with sources.346  But it is clear that 
the courts deciding these cases have overlooked or minimized the 
autonomy principle and how destructive these government intrusions 
can be to the independence and intrepidity of journalists. 
A third key structural characteristic of the Constitution is its 
emphasis on equality.  None of the rights protected in the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights is conferred only on a particular class 
of citizens.  Constitutional rights can be invoked by any citizen, 
provided the citizen is engaged in the underlying behavior that the 
right was designed to protect.347  Thus, any claim that the First 
Amendment supports recognition of special rights available only to 
the “institution of the press,” as Justice Stewart suggested, is 
contradicted by this equality principle.348  Such a claim is also 
 
 344. The negative rights framing of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and the latter’s clear 
emphasis on individual autonomy from the state suggests that a broader zone of freedom from 
the government ought to be recognized—one that does more than merely prohibit direct 
suppression of speech.  There are indirect actions that government can take that produce the 
same pernicious effects.  See supra note 77. 
 345. 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (“The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to 
respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do.”). See also McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 
530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We do not see why there need to be special criteria merely because 
the possessor of the documents . . . is a journalist.”). 
 346. See infra Part IV.A. 
 347. In the case of the First Amendment, this means that the citizen was gathering 
information of public interest for the purpose of communicating to an audience. 
 348. Justice Stewart might have challenged this seeming contradiction by pointing to the fact 
that the institution of “the press” was clearly identified in the text of the First Amendment.  
Thus, those rights can safely be awarded only to certain groups, much like, for example, Sixth 
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incompatible with the explicit language of the Constitution’s 
Preamble, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.349  
This ethos of equality reinforces the adoption of egalitarian 
definitions of “journalist” and “the press” that do not condition rights 
on the status, credentials, experience, or professional standing of those 
engaged in newsgathering and dissemination. 
On the other hand, a structural analysis provides little support for 
a right of access to government information or proceedings or of 
other affirmative rights under the First Amendment.  Similarly, there 
is little support for the notion of special rights for the press, as Justice 
Stewart urged,350 at least where the press is defined as a preferred 
class based on attributes other than the function they are performing.  
The structural analysis does however, support those who urge for 
recognition of a reporter’s privilege and other protections that 
preserve reporters’ investigative and expressive activity. 
D. Newsgathering and Context 
The preceding analysis suggests that there is substantial 
constitutional support for recognizing a broader right to gather news 
than the narrow right identified by the Supreme Court,351 and that this 
conclusion is defensible even without considering the contextual 
factors described next.  The text, history, and structure of the First 
Amendment and Constitution provide a sufficient foundation for 
protecting journalists’ ability to preserve confidential source 
relationships, repel newsroom searches and refuse to fully comply 
 
Amendment rights were designed specifically to protect criminal defendants, and Third 
Amendment rights were specifically designed to protect homeowners.  But this interpretation is 
built on the assumption that the Framers used the phrase “the press” to refer to a particular 
institution or class of speakers and not merely to the medium or the phenomenon of “the 
press.”  The evidence, though not uniform, favors the latter interpretation. 
 349. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state . . . deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (“We hold these Truths to be self evident, that all Men are created 
equal . . . .”). 
 350. See Stewart, supra note 38, at 636. 
 351. Despite its statement that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom 
of the press could be eviscerated,” Branzbrug v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972), the Court has 
not recognized any protections for newsgathering, except the right of the press and the public to 
attend certain judicial proceedings. 
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with government inquiries into their editorial processes, among other 
things.  Still, there are some protections that find less support from 
those sources but that might nevertheless be worthy of recognition, 
because they are essential to the exercise of other rights, or because 
they involve culturally embedded practices that are part of widely 
held conceptions of individual liberty. 
Undoubtedly, newsgathering activity is an accepted, culturally 
embedded practice.  Newsgathering is as old as the press itself, and it 
cannot be prohibited entirely without destroying the “bulwark” 
function of the press.  Even though newsgathering had not fully 
evolved by the time of the First Amendment’s ratification, it has 
grown more sophisticated and is now an essential component of 
contemporary notions of press freedom. 
Reporters have relied on sources since the earliest days of 
journalism, and independent observation of news events has been 
practiced since at least the late 1600s.352  During the Civil War period, 
these and other newsgathering techniques became more 
standardized.353  Unlike many of their predecessors, Civil War 
reporters relied on eyewitnesses, conducted interviews, and built their 
stories around multiple sources.354  In addition, Hazel Dicken-Garcia 
notes that “[r]eporters also cultivated high-ranking officials to 
maintain good relations and keep access to sources open.”355 
Reporters during this period also took seriously their obligations 
to their sources and took pains to protect sources’ identities.356  In 
1851, John Nugent of the New York Herald became the first reporter 
to claim a privilege when he was jailed for contempt of Congress after 
refusing to identify the source who leaked to him a secret draft of a 
proposed treaty.357  Maryland became the first state to pass a shield 
law to protect journalists’ confidentiality agreements in 1896.358  In 
 
 352. See supra text accompanying notes 295–311. 
 353. See DICKEN-GARCIA, supra note 307, at 51. 
 354. See id. at 53–55. 
 355. Id. at 55. 
 356. Dicken-Garcia notes that reporters did not identify their sources in their stories 
throughout most of the nineteenth century and that reporters’ bylines rarely appeared until the 
Civil War period and that this omission was part of “journalists’ ‘protected’ status.”  See id. at 
67–68. 
 357. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 515, 533 (2007). 
 358. See Bruce Bortz & Laura Bortz, ‘Pressing’ Out the Wrinkles in Maryland’s Shield Law 
for Journalists, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 461, 462 n.10 (1979). 
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this sense, most of the core professional practices today are not 
modern-day creations, but have been practiced for hundreds of years. 
There is also a long tradition of investigative journalism in the 
United States.359  Hazel Dicken-Garcia points out that during the Civil 
War, Northern reporters used disguises to avoid being detected while 
working in the South.360  This subterfuge provided an early model for 
the investigative reporters who proliferated at the end of the 
century.361  In 1880, Henry Demarest Lloyd published a series of 
magazine articles exposing corruption in business and politics.362  
Other “muckrakers” emerged in the early part of the twentieth 
century: Lincoln Steffens, who found evidence of widespread graft in 
America’s cities;363 Ida Tarbell, who revealed the abuses of Standard 
Oil Company;364 and Upton Sinclair, whose investigations brought 
attention to unsanitary meat-packing practices in Chicago.365  Other 
reporters followed their lead and over the course of the twentieth 
century investigative reporting became one of the principal 
components of mainstream American journalism. 
In some cases, these investigations involved undercover reporting 
and other deceptive practices.  In 1887, Nelly Bly (Elizabeth 
Cocheran) feigned insanity to expose inhumane conditions at 
Blackwell’s Island Asylum.366  Eighty-five years later, a young WABC 
reporter named Geraldo Rivera entered the grounds of a similar 
facility, the Willowbrook State School, to expose the poor treatment 
 
 359. See James Aucoin, Investigative Journalism, in AMERICAN JOURNALISM: HISTORY, 
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES 210 (W. David Sloan & Lisa Mullikin Parcell eds.) (2002) (“Although 
‘investigative journalism’—as practiced by professional journalists today—began in about the 
1920s, there has been an investigative spirit burning in American journalism ever since the 
colonial period.”). 
 360. See DICKEN-GARCIA, supra note 307, at 55. 
 361. Id. 
 362. These articles were The Story of a Great Monopoly and The Political Economy of 
Seventy-Three Million Dollars, published in 1881 and 1882 respectively, in the Atlantic Monthly, 
and Making Bread Dear and Lords of Industry, published in 1883 and 1884 respectively, in the 
North American Review.  Some consider Lloyd to be America’s first investigative journalist. 
 363. See generally LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE CITIES (1904).  This book is 
based on Steffens’ articles originally published in McClure’s. 
 364. See generally IDA TARBELL, HISTORY OF STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904).  This 
book is based on Tarbell’s articles originally published in McClure’s. 
 365. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1905). 
 366. Bly wrote a series of articles that first appeared in the New York World on Oct. 9, 1887.  
Bly’s series was later published in book form as Nellie Bly’s Ten Days in a Mad-House.  See 
generally BROOKE KROEGER, NELLY BLY: DAREDEVIL, REPORTER, FEMINIST 85–89 (1994). 
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of its mentally disabled patients.367  Scores of other undercover 
techniques, including hidden cameras and microphones, have become 
commonplace over the past century, whether their use is in all 
contexts legal or ethical.368  How is all of this relevant to the 
constitutionality of restrictions of newsgathering activity?  To the 
extent that the previous analyses of text, history, and structure provide 
a sufficient basis for recognizing newsgathering protections, these 
contextual considerations are unnecessary, although they certainly 
reinforce the earlier conclusions.  If, however, the text, history, and 
structure are inadequate, then some attempt should be made to 
evaluate the current cultural context and the public’s expectations. 
It would clearly be unconstitutional, for example, for Congress to 
pass a law prohibiting people from conducting interviews (at least for 
the purpose of disseminating the information to others).  Whether or 
not the text, history, or structure of the Constitution would prohibit 
such a law, the law would punish activity that is essential to the full 
exercise of the right to freedom of the press and it would forbid a 
practice that is “basic in our scheme of [First Amendment] values.”369  
The ability of journalists, and all citizens, to interact with others and to 
acquire new information and ideas is an elemental prerequisite for 
the meaningful exercise of expressive freedom.  That ability should be 
protected even though the act of interviewing someone is not, by 
itself, expressive.  The same argument could be made to challenge 
laws prohibiting undercover reporting.  Undercover reporting 
techniques are part of contemporary conceptions of freedom of the 
press and involve the kinds of antecedent acts that are critical to 
journalists’ ability to provide useful oversight of government officials 
and others who occupy powerful positions.  That is not to say that the 
contemporary context requires recognition of broader immunities for 
journalists who break the law or commit tortious acts while gathering 
news.370  But, for example, certainly any attempt to prohibit journalists 
 
 367. See generally GERALDO RIVERA, WILLOWBROOK: A REPORT ON HOW IT IS AND WHY 
IT DOESN’T HAVE TO BE THAT WAY (1972). 
 368. See generally Brief for Investigative Reporters and Editors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 97-2492, 97-2564 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 
1998), at 20–23, available at http://www.ire.org/obsolete/publications/IREBRIEF.PDF 
(describing dozens of instances where reporters have used undercover methods to expose 
information of vital public importance). 
 369. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958). 
 370. However, as indicated earlier, some kind of qualified protection ought to be recognized 
because of the high risk of abuse by prosecutors and plaintiffs in these kinds of cases. 
04__UGLAND_FINAL.DOC 7/23/2008  9:34:02 AM 
178 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 3:113 
from concealing their identities from others would be 
unconstitutional, at least where the non-disclosure is not fraudulent. 
These contextual arguments are more difficult to make when used 
to support protections for the use of hidden cameras or high-powered 
microphones.  These techniques are not part of a centuries-old 
tradition, although they are arguably modern applications of older 
methods.  One might agree that there is a culturally embedded 
expectation that journalists will be afforded a certain amount of 
autonomy from government, but not that they will be excused from 
their duties as citizens to respond to valid subpoenas.  The reporter’s 
privilege is a contested idea that has not been uniformly embraced by 
either courts or legislatures.371  Still, a social consensus should not be 
necessary for recognizing a constitutional right.  And in light of 
journalists’ long history of relying on confidential sources—one that 
predates the First Amendment’s ratification—the public probably 
does appreciate the special nature of reporter–source relationships 
and recognizes the risks posed by excessive government 
encroachments. 
This contextual analysis is more pertinent with respect to claims 
for affirmative rights—particularly rights of access to places and 
records.  Even though the text, history, and structure of the First 
Amendment and the Constitution evidence a negative-rights 
framework,372 a compelling case can be made that access rights are 
culturally embedded and that a living constitution must account for 
matters of profound societal expectation, such as the ability to witness 
what occurs in the criminal courts.373  That ability, which the Court 
recognized as First Amendment right in Richmond Newspapers, could 
be characterized as culturally embedded because America’s criminal 
courts have always been open.374  Still, any attempt to place this right 
within the ambit of the First Amendment is problematic because it 
necessitates an affirmative construction.  A better approach 
recognizes a right of access to the courts, not as part of an affirmative 
right to know, but as a necessary condition for the proper 
 
 371. See supra text accompanying notes 41–51. 
 372. See supra Part I.C. 
 373. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (“People in an open 
society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept 
what they are prohibited from observing.”). 
 374. The same is not true—at least not to the same extent—with access to records or to 
places other than the courts. 
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enforcement of rights protected by the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth 
Amendments.375 
IV.  RESHAPING NEWSGATHERING LAW 
In order to resolve some of the incongruities in the courts’ 
treatment of specific newsgathering problems, courts should begin by 
revisiting the three key issues addressed in Part I.  First, courts must 
reject Justice Stewart’s proposition that the Speech and Press Clauses 
be read to provide distinct sets of rights based on communicators’ 
expertise, credentials, or institutional affiliations.376  Courts must also 
cease to recognize special rights for the press—at least where “the 
press” is defined using expert-model criteria.  The Supreme Court in 
particular must explicitly disavow its statements differentiating the 
legal claims of media and non-media parties in its string of libel cases 
in the 1980s and 1990s.377  Although there is some conflicting evidence 
on the Framers’ intent regarding the Speech and Press Clauses, the 
best evidence suggests that they merely sought to distinguish the 
different means by which messages could be communicated, not to 
carve out a distinct constitutional status for the established printers.378  
The Framers clearly understood the unique capacity of the press to 
serve as a “bulwark of liberty,” driving public discourse and 
monitoring and exposing abuses by those in power.379  But because 
licensing of the press ceased long before the Revolution,380 and 
because there were no de jure barriers to any person’s use of that 
medium,381 it is implausible that if the Framers were alive today they 
 
 375. A more appropriate application of a contextual analysis (although still a challenging 
one) would be if, for example, Congress passed a law closing public and press access to the 
galleries in the House and Senate chambers.  This is a situation where there is no alternative 
constitutional hook like there is with access to the courts.  So, one would be forced to rely on 
the First Amendment and to propose an affirmative-rights construction, suggesting that because 
journalists have been provided access to House debates since the first Congress and because the 
Senate has been open since 1794, closing those chambers would thwart a critical societal 
expectation involving the processes by which citizens are governed. 
 376. Stewart, supra note 38. 
 377. See supra text accompanying notes 71–74. 
 378. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (1978) (dismissing 
the notion of a separate meaning for the Press Clause and arguing that the press merited 
separate mention by the framers merely because “it had been more often the object of official 
restraints”). 
 379. See Blasi, supra note 295, at 528. 
 380. See LEVY, supra note 240, at 36–37. 
 381. Anyone wanting to publish needed to have access to a printing press.  But this was an 
obstacle more readily overcome than a legal prohibition or a system of licensing. 
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would reserve “press” rights for the mainstream news media to the 
exclusion of freelancers, bloggers, or “lonely pamphleteers.”  Many 
eighteenth century publications were, after all, functionally equivalent 
to the burgeoning micro-media of today. 
Second, the courts must close the door on affirmative rights or 
find a sturdier basis for recognizing them.  Because the structure of 
the First Amendment and the Bill or Rights compels a negative 
construction, affirmative rights of access should not be recognized 
where they are built around a vague and boundless “right-to-know” 
rationale.  Whatever edifying benefits the right of access provides,382 
one cannot, as the Supreme Court has said, “confuse what is ‘good,’ 
‘desirable,’ or ‘expedient’ with what is constitutionally commanded by 
the First Amendment.  To do so is to trivialize constitutional 
adjudication.”383  Nevertheless, there are other constitutional hooks 
for recognizing some of these rights.384  Contextual arguments can also 
be applied to support some access claims—suggesting, for example, 
that a right of access to criminal courts is a culturally embedded 
expectation—but this requires a more nuanced interpretation, and 
one that is unnecessary given other bases for protection. 
Third, the courts must fashion a definition of “journalist” based 
upon the egalitarian and functional criteria described earlier—criteria 
that the Supreme Court has embraced in dicta385 and that some other 
courts have fleshed out more explicitly.386  Other approaches cannot 
be squared with the ethos of equality that pervades the Constitution, 
nor can they be reconciled with the overwhelming evidence that the 
Framers of the Constitution recognized and sought to safeguard the 
freedom of all citizens to serve—through both speech and press—as 
bulwarks of liberty.  The definitional question will not be an urgent 
 
 382. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1, 9 
(1986) (“[O]penness in criminal trials, including the selection of jurors, ‘enhances both the basic 
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in 
the system.’”). 
 383. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13 (1978). 
 384. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 385. Branzbrug v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972). 
 386. See, e.g., von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 1987) (“We hold that an 
individual claiming the journalist’s privilege must demonstrate, through competent evidence, 
the intent to use material sought to disseminate information to the public and that such intent 
existed at the inception of the newsgathering process.”).  The Court in von Bulow emphasized 
that those claiming the privilege need not be members of the “institutionalized press” as long as 
they are “involved in activities traditionally associated with gathering and disseminating news.”  
Id. at 142. 
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one for the Supreme Court until it revisits Branzburg; however, given 
the frequency with which reporters and courts clash over source 
confidentiality387 and the doctrinal discord among the federal 
circuits,388 an eventual reassessment seems inevitable. 
Making these changes will help resolve a number of the 
uncertainties and imperfections in the three key areas of 
newsgathering law: autonomy, liability, and access. 
A. Autonomy 
In nearly all of the Supreme Court’s newsgathering cases, the 
Court has rejected the media litigant’s claims, largely because the 
Court construed them as somehow pitting the rights of journalists 
against those of the broader public.389  The Court was correct to 
eschew special rights, but it miscast the media litigants’ claims in 
Cohen, Zurcher, Branzburg, and Herbert, among others,390 treating 
them as pleas for special protections instead of attempts to claim 
rights available to anyone who gathers news. 391  Because the Court 
characterized the press as a discrete class of citizens,392 instead of as a 
role that any citizen can play, it created an obstacle around which it 
was then forced to navigate.  Had the Court conceived of “the press” 
in more egalitarian terms, there would have been no special-rights 
problem.  Certainly, those protections would only be meaningful to 
those engaged in newsgathering activity, but that does not mean the 
protections would be special rights for which some citizens would be 
ineligible.  No one would say, for example, that the Third Amendment 
is a special right because its protections are only useful to 
homeowners,393 or that the Sixth Amendment is a special right because 
it is only applicable to those charged with federal crimes.394  These 
rights, like those under the First Amendment, are available to all, even 
if only some will ever need to invoke them. 
 
 387. See supra pp. 1–6. 
 388. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 389. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684–88. 
 390. In the prison access cases, for example, the Court reached the correct conclusions, but 
nevertheless mischaracterized the claims of the litigants as demands for exceptional treatment.  
See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); 
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
 391. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684–88. 
 392. See supra note 123. 
 393. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No soldier shall . . . be quartered in any house . . . .”). 
 394. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial . . . .”). 
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In addition to unnecessarily complicating the special rights 
problem, the Court’s newsgathering decisions have also undervalued 
the principle of autonomy.  Its decisions form around a simple 
dichotomy in which expressive activity is fully protected and can only 
be limited in extraordinary circumstances, while newsgathering 
activity is minimally protected and must often yield to other social 
concerns.395  The justices understand that there is a connection 
between newsgathering and expression,396 but they tend not to see 
restraints on the former as imperiling the latter.  The problem with 
subpoenas, newsroom searches, and inquiries into journalists’ editorial 
processes is not merely that these actions might jeopardize reporters’ 
relationships with sources, but that they could be used to harass, 
intimidate, and ultimately inhibit reporters’ future newsgathering and 
expression.  They present a wholly different set of hazards than does, 
for example, a denial of access to government records.  The latter 
forecloses one source of information; the former poses a risk that 
reporters will not seek that information in the first place—from any 
source—and that if they do, they will be reluctant to write about it.  In 
short, the separation between expression and newsgathering is much 
narrower in the autonomy contexts (e.g., Branzburg, Zurcher, 
Herbert) than in the access contexts (e.g., Richmond, Press 
Enterprise).  Restrictions on newsgathering are per se violations that 
suppress the free pursuit and publication of news, while the 
restrictions on access are more akin to denials of benefits or 
privileges. 
An interpretation of the First Amendment that fails to 
acknowledge and account for the potentially coercive effects of 
government usurpations of press autonomy cannot be sustained.  
These protections need not be absolute.  Newsgathering behavior is 
 
 395. The two-track model outlined by Justice Brennan in his famous Rutgers University 
speech essentially summarizes the Court’s approach.  Brennan, supra note 173, at 176 (“Under 
one model—which I call the ‘speech’ model—the press requires and is accorded the absolute 
protection of the First Amendment.  In the other model—I call it the ‘structural’ model—the 
press’ interests may conflict with other societal interests and adjustment of the conflict on 
occasion favors the competing claim.”).  But unlike many of his brethren, Justice Brennan 
appreciated the risks posed to the press’ autonomy and the inhibiting effect some seemingly 
content-neutral restrictions might have.  In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 196–98 (1979) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting), for example, he dissented in part to emphasize that while journalists 
ought not be immune from inquiries from libel plaintiffs, some qualified protection is necessary 
to minimize the risk of unnecessary or excessive intervention. 
 396. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (“[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”). 
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still one step removed from pure expression, but the ethos of 
autonomy that pervades the Constitution and the clear connection 
between autonomy and expression requires at least qualified 
protection for newsgathering.397 
B. Liability 
With the possible exception of the reporter’s privilege, the area of 
newsgathering law that has provoked the most debate in the past 
decade has been the use of content-neutral laws to punish 
newsgathering activity.  This tactic gained steam after the Court held 
in Cohen that journalists have no constitutional protection against 
“the application of general laws.”398  This holding invited plaintiffs to 
sue media organizations for fraud, trespass, and other torts based on 
how the journalists gathered their information rather than on what 
they broadcast or published.399  These cases have been controversial in 
part because they raise the most basic question: Is newsgathering, by 
itself, constitutionally protected?  The Supreme Court appeared to 
answer this question in Branzburg when it held that “news gathering 
is not without its First Amendment protections”400 and that “without 
some [First Amendment] protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”401  But the Court has 
never explained what it meant by these statements, nor has it actually 
recognized any newsgathering-specific rights. 
 
 397. These protections could take many forms.  The dissenting justices in many of these 
cases have actually outlined proposals that strike an acceptable balance.  In Branzburg, Justices 
Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall suggested that before a reporter could be made to comply with 
a subpoena, the government must:  “(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the 
newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) 
demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less 
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding 
interest in the information.”  Id. at 743.  This approach has been followed by several lower 
courts and has served as the model for several state shield laws.  In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 
436 U.S. 547 (1978), Justices Stewart and Marshall argued that a newsroom search should only 
be permitted when the possessor of the information sought has refused to comply with a valid 
subpoena.  Id. at 547, 575–76 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Furthermore, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 
U.S. 153 (1979), Justice Brennan argued that before libel plaintiffs could inquire about 
journalists’ editorial processes, they must first demonstrate that the underlying publication was 
both false and defamatory.  Id. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 398. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting Associated Press v. 
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937)). 
 399. See supra text accompanying notes 96–114. 
 400. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707. 
 401. Id. at 681. 
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Under the Court’s longstanding First Amendment doctrine, 
general laws that do not target expression (i.e., content-neutral laws) 
are nevertheless subject to heightened scrutiny where their 
enforcement imposes incidental burdens on free expression.402  In 
O’Brien v. United States, the Court held that, to sustain such a law, the 
government must show that it serves a substantial government 
interest and that its impact on expression is no greater than 
necessary.403  It is perplexing, then, that the Court in Cohen made no 
mention of O’Brien.404  Promissory estoppel is a generally applicable 
law, and it was applied in Cohen in a manner that punished two 
newspapers’ decisions to publish information of clear public interest 
(i.e., that an aide to a gubernatorial candidate was engaging in smear 
tactics to subvert a political opponent).405  Perhaps the Court saw 
Cohen not as a case about expression, but about the enforceability of 
pre-publication contractual agreements.  But Cohen was about more 
than pre-publication issues.  Indeed, the lawsuit was triggered when 
two newspapers published articles containing information that was 
clearly newsworthy and relevant to the outcome of a political 
campaign.406 
The Court was wrong in Cohen, both in the outcome it reached 
and in the way it framed the issue.  But what about fraud and trespass 
cases where the triggering act is unrelated to, or at least separable 
from, publication?  If one contends that newsgathering is not 
constitutionally protected, then the answer is simple: The cases can be 
adjudicated under the Food Lion framework that prohibits 
publication-related damages but that applies no unusual scrutiny to 
the underlying tort.407  But can this approach be squared with the 
Supreme Court’s declaration in Branzburg that newsgathering is 
constitutionally protected?408  What the Court said in Branzburg 
 
 402. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 403. See id. at 377 (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if 
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest.”). 
 404. See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 405. Id. at 668–70. 
 406. In Cohen, the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star Tribune published stories 
indicating that the plaintiff, a high-ranking campaign worker for a gubernatorial candidate, was 
engaged in a campaign to anonymously impugn the character of the opposing candidate.  Id. at 
665. 
 407. See generally Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 408. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). 
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seems innocuous, if not self-evident, yet the courts have not given any 
concrete meaning to that abstract sentiment.  Looking only at the 
outcomes of Supreme Court cases, it appears that newsgathering is 
not constitutionally protected and that the Supreme Court’s 
statements to the contrary in Branzburg were just platitudinous dicta.  
But if a law were passed that prohibited people from conducting 
interviews, or from taking photographs or shooting video in public 
places, it seems unlikely that the Court would acquiesce.  If it did, the 
Court would have to disavow its statements regarding newsgathering 
from Branzburg and declare that newsgathering is not protected.409  If 
it rejected such restrictions, however, the Supreme Court and lower 
courts would have to reconsider a whole line of cases, including Food 
Lion, where general laws affecting newsgathering were given no 
heightened scrutiny, except to the extent they directly impacted 
expression.410 
The evidence from the sequential analysis outlined in this Article 
suggests that the Supreme Court’s Branzburg dicta was correct.  
There are non-expressive acts that are essential to individual 
autonomy, individual self-fulfillment, and individuals’ capacity to 
serve as effective watchdogs.  As the Supreme Court put it more than 
seventy years ago, the government should not be permitted to disturb 
the “the natural right of the members of an organized society, united 
for their common good, to impart and acquire information about their 
common interests.”411  This does not mean that government must 
affirmatively aid those efforts, but the First Amendment circumscribes 
its ability to interfere with them.  And because that interference can 
come in the form of either content-based or content-neutral laws, and 
because it can target either expression or pure newsgathering, there 
must be some opportunity to weigh the competing interests and to 
test the sincerity of the government’s purposes.  The Court’s 
categorical framework set forth in Cohen leaves open too many 
opportunities for abuse by hostile officials and clever plaintiffs. 
The simplest solution is to apply the intermediate scrutiny test 
from O’Brien both to cases in which neutral laws incidentally burden 
expression—which the Court has always done, Cohen 
notwithstanding—and to cases in which those laws incidentally 
 
 409. See id. (“News gathering is not without its First Amendment protections . . . .”). See 
also supra text accompanying notes 41–47. 
 410. See supra text accompanying notes 92–106. 
 411. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936) (emphasis added). 
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burden newsgathering.412  Properly applying the O’Brien test in the 
newsgathering context would permit plaintiffs who have been harmed 
by a newsgatherer’s non-expressive behavior to recover damages, but 
would respect the newsgatherer’s expressive interests both by 
prohibiting publication-related damage awards and by ensuring that 
de minimus tort violations are not used to harass newsgatherers or 
elicit punitive damage awards from sympathetic juries.413 
Intermediate scrutiny in these contexts would provide sufficient 
protection, but only if applied properly.  In making the initial 
determination whether a law is content-based or content-neutral, 
courts must examine both the government’s motivations and its 
patterns of enforcement.  Indeed, even the O’Brien court did not 
acknowledge the strong evidence showing that the prohibition on 
destroying draft cards was motivated by an intent to suppress dissent, 
despite the fact that the Court had previously acknowledged the 
relevance of motive.414  So, while the test the Court relied upon in 
O’Brien is useful, it must be applied in a more searching way than the 
Court did in the O’Brien case itself.  Otherwise, neutral language can 
continue to be used to disguise press-punitive laws, and neutral laws 
will be applied discriminatorily to suppress newsgathering and 
expression.415 
C. Access 
Although the Supreme Court has been relatively consistent in 
employing a negative-rights template in speech and press cases, its 
access rulings have introduced anomalous arguments that find no 
support in either the text or history of the First Amendment or in the 
 
 412. See Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 117, at 1161 (suggesting that intermediate scrutiny 
be applied to tort claims affecting newsgathering). 
 413. Although the First Amendment should protect the newsgathering rights of 
communicators as well as their expressive rights, a generally applicable law that only implicates 
the former would often be acceptable under O’Brien.  The newsgathering freedom described 
above would therefore have limited reach.  But where someone’s newsgathering interests and 
their expressive interests are put in jeopardy, the law’s application would be more likely to fail 
O’Brien.  So, if a plaintiff only sought compensation for the actual harm caused by a reporter’s 
trespass, for example, O’Brien would rarely stand in the way.  But if any attempt were made to 
punish the subsequent publication, either by the awarding of publication damages, or by 
enforcement of a contrived tort claim, O’Brien would provide some protection. 
 414. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985). 
 415. Nathan Siegel, Law and the Media: Striking a Balance for the Future, 1999 ANN. SURV. 
OF AM. L. 207, 214 (1999) (“If in reality these torts have to be stretched and bent so far just to 
try to find some theory to use as a pretext to sue the media for what’s being reported, we are not 
really dealing here with laws that would generally be applied to people other than journalists.”). 
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structure of the broader Constitution.  There are other constitutional 
provisions that provide a sound basis for recognizing some access 
rights, but the Court weakened its First Amendment architecture by 
building its rulings in Richmond Newspapers, etc.,416 around the 
amorphous right-to-know/public-edification concept.417  In Globe 
Newspapers, the Court wrote that “to the extent that the First 
Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to 
ensure that this constitutionally protected ‘discussion of governmental 
affairs’ is an informed one.”418  But this rationale provides no basis for 
concluding that access to the judiciary is different from access to any 
other government proceeding.419  Its reach is limitless. 
Had the Court relied solely on the historical rationale, it could 
have made a contextual argument suggesting that the right of access 
to the courts is culturally embedded and an essential dimension of 
individual liberty.  But that approach requires an affirmative 
construction of the First Amendment, which, even if legitimate, is 
nevertheless unnecessary, because the same result can be reached by 
relying on other constitutional provisions.  A better approach, and one 
that permits a purely negative-rights construction of the First 
Amendment, is to provide access to the judiciary as a matter of 
procedural fairness, guaranteed to all citizens by the Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Amendments. Collectively, these provisions 
should be read as providing all citizens—both criminal defendants 
and civil litigants—with a constitutional guarantee that the judicial 
process will function equitably.  Although judges would retain some 
discretion to close proceedings in rare circumstances, under this 
 
 416. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also Press 
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County (Press Enterprise II), 478 
U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. 
501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 417. The Constitution does support a “right to know” with respect to citizens’ ability to 
receive information, but not a right to demand information from the government.  The latter is 
an affirmative right.  The former, however, is a negative right that prohibits government 
interference in the exchange of information between autonomous individuals (or groups), which 
is a principle the Court has correctly upheld.  Cf. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 
(1965) (holding that law requiring post-masters to hold mail that the Secretary of the Treasury 
determined to be communist propaganda until addressee affirmatively requested the mail’s 
release was unconstitutional as against the First Amendment). 
 418. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604–605. 
 419. It is true that citizens have an interest in knowing that the political and administrative 
branches of government are also functioning equitably and in ways that serve the public 
interest, but the judgments made by judges and juries are more permanent and less easily 
remedied through the normal political processes than are those made by public officials in the 
other branches. 
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negative-rights construction citizens would be presumptively free to 
witness all civil and criminal court proceedings, much as they are 
today.420 
CONCLUSION 
The first decade of the twenty-first century has already been one 
of the most catalytic periods in the history of American journalism.  
The media marketplace is still dominated by the traditional goliaths, 
but the mainstream media’s audiences and influence are dwindling 
with the emergence of new media and new journalistic forms.  These 
changes are occurring in a political climate that illustrates the need 
for vigilant oversight of government by journalists and citizens from 
every social and ideological stratum.  Unfortunately, the power of 
public oversight is weakened by the disjointed legal framework that 
continues to govern the right to gather news. 
The courts need to restructure their jurisprudence regarding 
newsgathering and the First Amendment in a way that coheres 
around a set of core principles—e.g., negative constitutional 
constructions, no special rights, egalitarian conceptions of “the 
press”—and that flows from a sensible and consistent approach to 
constitutional interpretation.  The sequential approach proposed in 
this Article is just one method (or cluster of methods), but its 
application here should illustrate not only that stronger protections 
for newsgathering are constitutionally supportable, but that doing so 
does not require any interpretive contortions or the application of 
exotic theories. 
Throughout the past three decades the Court has responded to 
media claims in ways that fail to adequately protect all citizens’ 
expressive and newsgathering rights. These decisions and approaches 
have created confusion about the dimensions of the Court’s First 
Amendment doctrine.  The alternative approach proposed here builds 
 
 420. Technically, this right would not “belong” solely to the individuals seeking access or to 
those involved in the litigation, which means that access is not a right that could be waived.  The 
litigants would not be free to decide for themselves what procedural safeguards are warranted, 
because all citizens have a stake in the proper functioning of that process, and because there is a 
danger that some criminal defendants could be coerced into waiving their rights.  The proposal 
supported here would not, therefore, revive the Court’s ruling in Gannett Co., Inc. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979) (explaining that access is an issue rooted in the Sixth 
Amendment right to an open trial, and because that right belongs to criminal defendants, they 
are free to waive it). 
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off the strengths of the Court’s approach while righting its mistakes to 
seek a more predictable and internally consistent legal framework 
oriented around a particular approach to constitutional 
interpretation. 
Toward that end, this Article suggests that the Court begin 
defining First Amendment rights in terms of expression and 
newsgathering, rather than speech and press; that it abandon any 
suggestion that “freedom of the press” implies anything other than 
the freedom of all citizens to seek out the news and to communicate it 
through media; that it reverse its ruling in Cohen and dispose of the 
“generally applicable laws” straight-jacket it imposed on lower courts; 
that it find a different constitutional basis for recognizing rights of 
access to the judiciary; that it reverse Branzburg, Herbert, and 
Zurcher and the other autonomy cases and recognize that some 
qualified privileges are necessary in these contexts to prevent the 
chilling of expression and newsgathering.  Finally, in employing these 
constitutional protections, the Court should adopt a definition of the 
press that is focused on the functions being performed rather than the 
identity or characteristics of those performing them.  As Chief Justice 
Burger wrote: “The First Amendment does not ‘belong’ to any 
definable category of persons or entities: It belongs to all who 
exercise its freedoms.”421 
 
 421. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
